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Since 1972 when China and Japan established their formal diplomatic relationship, 
considerable ruptures and disputes have been haunting the reconciliation between 
these two countries. The increasing complexity of the differences between the 
Chinese state and public in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations indicates that the 
historical memory and how people perceive and respond to memory has become a 
crucial factor impeding the reconciliation. Notwithstanding the ideological and 
victory narrative that once suppressed the traumatic memory, the inherent suspicion 
of Japan still largely outweighs any positive attitude. Nevertheless, the prevailing 
negative attitude of the Chinese public is essentially the result of state narrative even 
if the Chinese government has actually been making salient efforts to ameliorate the 
relationship with Japan. Thus the central factor for the Chinese is chosen traumas, a 
mental representation transmitted at a trans-generational level of past historical events, 
varying with the three actors of state, media and public. Three case studies including 
Fukuda’s visit to China in 2007, the 2003 New Thinking, and the 1998 Jiang Zemin 
visit to Japan will further elaborate the argument.  
 
My interpretation sheds light on the complicated variation of the interaction of the 
Chinese government, media and public concerning Sino-Japanese relations along with 
the historical evolvement from the foundation of the PRC to some current events. The 
future reconciliation of China and Japan, if possible, is connected more with the 
  V
solution of historically rooted and visceral distrust of Japan derived from the 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
Since 1972 when China and Japan established their formal diplomatic relations, 
considerable collisions and disputes have been haunting this peculiar bilateral 
relationship. Yasukuni Shrine visit, Diaoyu Island dispute, East China Sea oil conflict 
and many other issues, big or small, salient or unnoticeable, have been continuously 
overshadowing the relations between China and Japan. Contrary to some expectations, 
increasing economic interdependence between the two countries over the last twenty 
years has not engendered a closer political relationship. The mutual mistrust, evident 
on the Chinese side in dealing with the historical problem, has hampered the 
reconciliation and diplomatic interchange. Hence the significance of the research on 
this topic is that the two countries have not yet fully reconciled the past, and this has 
broader repercussions in the region. The tension caused by diplomatic disagreements 
has the potential to impact the stability and the development of the East Asian 
region.1 According to Allen Whiting’s assessment in China Eyes Japan, negative 
images of Japan have thwarted China’s interest in closer relations with its Asian 
neighbor.2  
In contrast with the situation in Europe where most states seem to have overcome 
nationalist hatreds to arrive at political reconciliation, and even a grand vision of 
regional integration, nothing remotely so ambitious exists in the Asia-Pacific region. 
                                                        
1 Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese relations: Facing the past, looking to the future? (Routledge 
Curzon, c2005). 
2 Allen Whiting, China eyes Japan, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p.19. 
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Suspicions and resentments rooted in history continue to dominate political 
reconciliation efforts in the region. The residue of Japanese aggression and atrocities 
is deeply embedded in the Chinese national consciousness and has, despite the 
normalization of inter-state relations, continued to resurface intermittently to the 
present day. A political psychology perspective could be particularly valuable in 
understanding the difficulty of China-Japan reconciliation in that the public’s hostile 
attitude has been much stronger than the official reaction on Japan during the past 
decade, despite the recent efforts made by Chinese and Japanese leadership.  
  
PERSPECTIVE, RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT OF 
THE RESEARCH 
 
The factors overshadowing the Sino-Japanese relationship spans a large spectrum. 
One of the most crucial factors is the power politics concern between China and 
Japan. Many scholars in this field have shed light on China’s foreign policy thinking 
and setting process, assessing Chinese government’s perception of the international 
environment, the theory of “China Threat”, and the delicate variation of 
U.S.-China-Japan triangular relations.3 For example, scholars such as Ming Wan, 
J.Pollack, Ishii Akira argue about a downward Sino-Japanese relationship since the 
                                                        
3 See Kalder, Kent. China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry. Foreign Affairss, Vol. 85, No. 2, 
(2006). Sutter, Robert, Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). Tsuji Kogo, “Chugoku ni okeru Yoron Keisei to Tainichi 
Yoron Kozo” (“The Process of the Public Opinion Formation in China and the Structure of the 
Public Opinion on Japan”), Kokusai Mondai, No.492, 2001. 
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1990s.4 “China and Japan have had a cyclical, dispute-prone but confrontation-averse 
political relationship, which has operated between clear boundaries.”5 As K.Kent 
points out, the contest for regional leadership between China and Japan today is 
creating new security dilemmas, prompting concerns over Chinese ambitions in Japan 
and fears of renewed Japanese militarism in China. Kent argues that such an 
increasing confrontation also exacerbates the fueling nationalism on both sides.6 Not 
surprisingly, China is concerned about Japan seeking a greater role, in particular a 
military role, in world politics. Jian Yang claims that worries on the Chinese side have 
increased over the past decade due to Japan’s gradual strategic shift away from 
“homeland defense.”7 Some scholars have even predicted a simmering Sino-Japanese 
rivalry based on the competition and frictions in such issues as the leading role in 
Asian regional organizations, Japan’s bid for UNSC permanent seat, and the power 
projection in Southeast Asia, Russia, India and the Korean Peninsula.8    
The security concern, in line with the engagement of the U.S. as a dominant 
player in the region, is also pivotal in the picture. Many scholars have paid 
considerable attention to the security dilemma between China and Japan, as well as 
                                                        
4 Ming Wan. Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006). Ash Robert, 
Shambaugh David, Takagi Seiichiro, China watching : perspectives from Europe, Japan and the 
United States (London ; New York : Routledge, 2007). 
5 Ishii Akira, “Shiren ni tatsu ‘Sekai no naka no Nicchu Kankei’” (“ Japan-China Relations in the 
World’ in the Moment of Truth”), Kokusai Mondai, No.418 (1995). p.12. 
6 Kalder, Kent. China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry. Foreign Affairss, Vol. 85, No. 2, (2006). 
7  Jian, Yang, China’s security policy towards Japan, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) 
China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) 
8  See Kalder, Kent. China and Japan’s Simmering Rivalry. Foreign Affairss, Vol. 85, No. 2, 
(2006). Sutter, Robert, Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). Robert Ash, David Shambaugh, Seiichiro Takagi. (Eds.) 
China watching: perspectives from Europe, Japan and the United States,( London ; New York : 
Routledge, 2007).  
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the role of the U.S. in this aspect. For example, Robert Sutter states that both China 
and Japan are concerned to a limited extent with the military modernization of the 
other, and both see the actions of the other as having changed the strategic 
environment. A breakdown in the relationship would have serious implications for 
regional security.9 From a realistic view, Mochizuki asserts that the emergence of a 
new great power can lead to a cycle of hegemonic rivalry and war. The rise of China 
inevitably presents such a systemic challenge to Japan.10 Considering the role of the 
U.S., “a Japan that continues to align with the United States will enhance US leverage 
and help sustain its preponderant power even as Chinese capabilities grow”.11 Heazle 
states that the US-Japan Security Alliance will still remain at the core of the Northeast 
Asian security. China would therefore consider the rationale of the continued 
existence and expansion of such an alliance as a threat to China’s Taiwan strategy.12 
In particular, Sutter points out that Taiwan and North Korea are two potential 
flashpoints and long-term uncertainties in Sino-Japanese relations. In both cases, 
China and Japan loom as the strategic concern for each other. The emergence of a 
North Korea crisis or Taiwan crisis may easily and seriously damage the 
Sino-Japanese relationship.13 Heazle also focuses on energy security as a possible 
                                                        
9  Sutter, Robert, Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). 
10  Mochizuki , Mike, Dealing with a Rising China, in Thomas U. Berger, Mike M. Mochizuki, 
Jitsuo Tsuchiyama. (Eds.) Japan in international politics: the foreign policies of an adaptive state, 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers: Published in association with the Japan Forum on 
International Relations, 2007). 
11 Ibid, p.229. 
12  Heazle, Michael, Nationalism, security, and prosperity, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) 
China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.177. 
13 Sutter, Robert, Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008). 
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source of the political tension between China and Japan as both countries are striving 
to gain access to reliable oil and gas supplies.14  
The economic interdependence between Japan and China makes another leading 
variable in Sino-Japanese relations. China has surpassed the U.S. as Japan’s largest 
trade partner. Japan’s Development Assistance (ODA) to China has been playing a 
positive and significant role in China-Japan economic cooperation ever since 1979.15 
Many scholars have seen such an increasing economic interdependence as an 
optimistic indicator regarding Sino-Japanese relations.16 For example, Ming Wan 
claims that although there remain certain economic frictions, both sides have been 
attempting to resolve this through increased consultation. Nevertheless, Min Wan, 
along with other scholars in the field, share the notion that the course of 
Sino-Japanese relations has been following a track of hot economy and cold politics 
for many years.17 Heazle also argues that “Increasing economic cooperation and 
integration have occurred in tandem with growing levels of political discord and 
animosity between the two governments over a broad range of problems”. 18 
Christopher Howe incisively points out that the exchange of commodities between 
China and Japan “has followed a predictable pattern, based on close proximity and 
                                                        
14  Heazle, Michael, Nationalism, security, and prosperity, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) 
China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.198. 
15  Liping, Xia, Living in the past? The politics of nationalism in China, in Michael Heazle, Nick 
Knight, (Eds.) China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past? 
(Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) 
16  See Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: 
creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.). 
17 Ming Wan. Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006) 
18 Heazle, Michael, Nationalism, security, and prosperity, in Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) 
China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK; 
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.179. 
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obvious differences in resource endowment and comparative advantage, while the 
scale and institutional framework of trade have reflected the tortuous evolution of 
political relations…”19  
China's rise posing a threat to Japan, fueling nationalism on both sides, the U.S. 
role in strengthening alliances with Japan and defending Taiwan, as well as the 
increasing economic interdependence and deepening Asian regionalism have all 
played as pivotal variables in the picture of China-Japan relations. The variation of 
the relationship, however, has been through significant fluctuations since year 1972 of 
diplomatic normalization.20 Roy claims that the Sino-Japanese relationship has not 
gone through a real complete reconciliation whereas in purely economic terms, 
Sino-Japanese relations appear to be at an all time high.21 The inconsistency of the 
development of Sino-Japanese relations illuminates the significance of non-economic 
factors and also the strong influence of perceptions rooted in the troubled and often 
violent interaction between the two countries. Kojima, for example, points out 
simultaneous progression of exchanges on the surface and frictions and conflicts 
underneath, and examines mutual perceptions at popular level as the cause of the 
friction and conflict.22 Scholars including Michael Heazle, Hidenori Ijiri, Yinan He, 
                                                        
19 Howe Christopher, China, Japan and Economic Interdependence in the Asia Pacific Region, in 
Christoper Howe (Eds.) China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects. (Oxford : Clarendon 
Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1996.) p.98. 
20 Ming Wan. Sino-Japanese relations: interaction, logic, and transformation (Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.2006) 
21 See Denny Roy (2004), “Stirring samurai, disapproving dragon: Japan’s growing security 
activity and Sino-Japanese relations”, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 31(2), Summer, 
Expanded Academic ASAP Plus. Söderberg Marie, Chinese-Japanese relations in the twenty-first 
century : complementarity and conflict. (London ; New York : Routledge, 2002.).  
22  Kojima Tomoyuki, “Gendai Nicchuu Kankeiron” (On Contemporary Japan-China 
Relationship), in Hirano Ken’ichiro, ed., op.cit. 1994. 
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and Peter Gries insist that the bewildering Sino-Japanese relationship is the result of 
both governments pursuing interests such as energy security, greater political and 
economic influence, and the consolidation of strong, contemporary national identity. 
The interests are significantly being shaped by concerns over future intentions and 
existing notions of national identity.23 Heazle particularly indicates that “The history 
of the Sino-Japanese relationship, and the differing perceptions of this history on both 
sides, has contributed in a very major way to a widespread sense of suspicion, 
resentment, and hostility between the two nations.”24 
What is the core of the Chinese national identity, if it is crucial to the variation of 
China-Japan interaction, on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations? What is the 
influence of history or past memory on such a national identity, the mutual 
perceptions between China and Japan, and the development of China-Japan relations 
as a consequence? Considering the subtlety and complexity of the nature of stagnant 
Sino-Japanese relations, this paper will look into “Chosen Traumas”, namely a mental 
representation that is transmitted at a trans-generational level of past historical events, 
to examine the situation. It is a shared mental notion of a traumatic past event during 
which large groups suffered loss and experienced helplessness, shame, and 
humiliation in conflict with another large group. “The trans-generational transmission 
                                                        
23 Ijiiri Hidenori, Sino-Japanese Controversy Since the 1972 Diplomatic Normalization, in 
Christoper Howe (Eds.) China and Japan: History, Trends, and Prospects. (Oxford : Clarendon 
Press ; New York : Oxford University Press, 1996.) Yinan He, History, Chinese Nationalism and 
the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,, Journal of Contemporary China, Volume 16, Number 50, 
February, 2007. Peter, Gries, China’s New Nationalism (University of California Press, 2004). 
Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: creating a 
future past? (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) 
24  Michael Heazle, Nick Knight, (Eds.) China-Japan relations in the twenty-first century: 
creating a future past? (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2007.) p.2. 
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of such a shared traumatic event is linked to past generation’s inability to mourn 
losses of people, land or prestige, and indicates the large group’s failure to reverse 
narcissistic injury and humiliation inflicted by another large group, usually a 
neighbor.”25 In other words, the memory of a particular trauma was chosen, not 
necessarily in an intentional manner, to consolidate the national identity and affect 
certain international relations of a particular nation. Aside from Professor Vamik 
Volkan who actually conceptualizes chosen traumas as an instrumental framework 
that can be applied to certain areas in political science, some psychologists and 
political scientists have also been introducing the knowledge of memory and trauma 
to analyze certain political issues. In addition to Volkan, there is a growing literature 
on trauma and politics crossing disciplinary boundaries. Peter Novick’s The 
Holocaust and Collective Memory emphasizes the political expediency of trauma 
discourse.26 Following Novick’s claim, K.M.Fierke focuses on understanding trauma 
as a social-political concept and argues that trauma may be expressed in the habitual 
memory of a culture, providing social legitimation for performative acts.27 
In this thesis, I will try to link the status-quo of Sino-Japanese relations to the 
chosen traumas of the three actors, namely the state, media and public in China. The 
major problem of stagnant Sino-Japanese relations should be attributed to the failure 
of reconciliation. Such a failure is caused more by the inability to deal with the past 
                                                        
25 Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of 
Large-Group Identity. Group Analysis, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001): 80. 
26  See Peter Novick, The Holocaust and Collective Memory: the American experience 
(Bloomsbury, 1999). 
27 See Duncan, Bell, Memory, Trauma and World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
p.117. 
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than a failure to settle contemporary issues. Thus the absence of a shared memory 
underlines the difficult status quo of Sino-Japanese relations.  
As far as the Chinese side is concerned, people could not successfully relinquish 
the past and look forward to a more rational and future-oriented relations due to the 
chosen trauma effect in their collective memory. Such a trauma varies according to 
different historical phases with the coherent variation of the different actors at 
different times. Chosen traumas, as a result of state ideological restrain to an 
increasingly independent factor prevailing in the public opinion, not only confine the 
possibility of complete reconciliation, but also impede the future development of 
Sino-Japanese relations. Unlike the wish of Premier Zhou Enlai that “the friendship 
between our two great nations shall pass on from generation to generation”28 in 1972, 
what actually passed over generations was the chosen traumas of the old war. The 
Chinese viewed the Japanese as the paradigmatic “devils” during World War II, and 
they continue to view them that way today.29 
Specifically, four core research questions are to be answered. Firstly, in an 
attempt to promote societal stability and unity, the Chinese government is determined 
to create a harmonious atmosphere and vigorously advocates maintaining stability at 
all costs. Yet the drastic anti-Japan sentiment, best represented by the 2005 anti-Japan 
riots sweeping the major metropolises in China, is obviously contradictory to the 
priority of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), i.e. maintaining social stability and 
deepening reform and opening. Although some people may still insist that such 
                                                        
28 Huan Tian, ed. Zhanhou zhongri guanxi wenxianji, (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue, 1997), 
Vol.2. p. 109. 
29 Peter, Gries, China’s New Nationalism (University of California Press, 2004), p.10. 
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xenophobia is indeed the tactic the CCP adopts to deflect attention from the sensitive 
domestic politics, the government crackdown following the 2005 riots seemed to 
imply a worry about collective and spontaneous movement action.  
Secondly, we are still unable to provide a sound explanation about why in the 
1980s the relations were surprisingly in tune and the government tried to popularize 
the slogan “Friendship forever between China and Japan”. More importantly, such a 
slogan appeared to be tolerated by the people at that time and was echoed by the 
well-known popularity of certain Japanese products and TV dramas.  
Thirdly, for the past thirty years, huge efforts have been made in dealing with the 
historical issues but the past, crystallized around the Yasukuni Shrine visit and the 
textbook conflict, still weighs the most on contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. 
Nevertheless, time did not wash away the mark of the anti-Japanese war and the 
crimes of Japanese troops; on the contrary, the Chinese public has been used to 
perceiving Sino-Japanese relations as a collection of unresolved history problems.  
Last but not the least, in contrast with the older generation who had actually 
experienced the war, the younger generation seems to have an even tougher stance 
and a more visceral negative attitude towards Japan and Japanese people.30 Such an 
inexplicable phenomenon has added more difficulty for China and Japan to settle the 
past.   
                                                        
30 For the analysis of the different generations of the Chinese post-war society, the “founding 
fathers”, like Mao and Deng, and the people at the same age are generally regarded as the first 
generation. The second generation was considered to be the people who lived their youth around 
1950-1978. The third generation referred to the people whose thoughts and ideas were drastically 
refreshed after the opening and reform decision. For details, see Orville Schell, Mandate of 
heaven: a new generation of entrepreneurs, dissidents, bohemians, and technocrats lays claim to 
China's future. (New York: Simon & Schuster, c1994.) 
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THE FUNCTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF STATE, PUBLIC AND 
MEDIA 
 
A functional definition of state is necessary. Despite the general definition of state as 
a supreme social association or organization within whose frame politics will 
determine its legislation and policies, the definition of the Chinese state on 
Sino-Japanese relations, especially when a political psychology view is taken, is 
special.31 Its authoritarian and non-democratic nature determines that the definition 
in this case will mostly involve the dominant decision makers in a highly centralized 
and hierarchical political structure as well as their foreign policy setting.32 It includes 
an authoritarian political ideology or belief system providing and reinforcing 
authoritarian conventional beliefs. It is also the main instrument through which 
dominant decision makers acquire power on foreign policy making.33 
It is equally crucial about the definition of public in this case. So is the leading 
concern of at what level of analysis the political psychology perspective can best 
apply to Sino-Japanese relations. I will suggest that it will mostly include the 
intellectuals and urbanites, who have the access to the compulsory education, the 
opportunities of exposure to mass media, and who have some basic historical 
knowledge of the anti-Japanese war, considering the diversification and the 
                                                        
31 Wiseman, H.V. Political Systems (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967) 
32 Levy, Jack, Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, in David O. Sears, Leonie Huddy, and 
Robert Jervis (Eds.) Oxford Handbook of political psychology (New York : Oxford University 
Press, c2003). 
33 Meloen, Jos. The Political Culture of State Authoritarianism, in Stanley Renshon (Eds.) 
Political Psychology: Cultural and Cross-Cultural Foundations. (New York : New York University 
Press, 2000). 
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complication of the concept of “Chinese public.”34 
Another pivotal issue is about the real function of mass media and in which way 
they can actually transmit the memory. Alison Landsberg underlines the possibilities 
for a progressive politics of memory in our mass-mediated era. Through subtle and 
theoretically informed readings of autobiographies, novels, films, and museum 
exhibits about martyrs and the holocaust, monuments, she shows us how what she 
revealingly calls “prosthetic memories” can produce empathy and social 
responsibility (or antagonism and instability in this case). How we think about the 
past matters in the present.35 As far as the Chinese media is concerned, it is thus 
evident that the tremendous legacy composed of high school history books, numerous 
anti-Japanese films, prevailing stories of anti-Japanese heroes in the novels and other 
forms of media have made a synergy to continuously remind the people of the war. 
On the other hand, the media are not merely passive transmitters of the far-reaching 
chosen traumas but have actively engaged in the evolution of traumas based on the 
different patterns the mass media adapt to and the lucrative commercial interests 
involved. “Media tabloidism” may also go hand in hand with the audience’s growing 
appetite for sensationalism in the commercial market.36 The memory of trauma may 
not always be traumatic, as it is likely to mix with the indulgence in the excitement of 
potential belligerence. 
                                                        
34 See Gordon White, Jude Howell, and Shang Xiaoyuan. In search of civil society: market 
reform and social change in contemporary China, (Oxford: Clarendon Press; Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996.) William C. Kirby ed. Realms of freedom in modern China, 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004.) 
35 Alison Landsberg. Prosthetic memory: the transformation of American remembrance in the 
age of mass culture, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). p.26. 
36 Yu Huang and Chin-Chuan Lee, Peddling Party Ideology for a Profit: Media and the Rise of 
Chinese Nationalism in the 1990s (London: Routledge Curzon, 2003), p.49. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
Based on the nature of my study and the data available, my research will adopt a 
substantially qualitative approach and analytical description. This thesis requires 
intensive knowledge on the topic and therefore the analysis of historical data is 
particularly important.  
Besides the secondhand data from newspapers, journals, online resources and of 
course the studies of other researchers, my research is also based on the firsthand data 
collected in my fieldtrip. During December 2007, I spent two weeks in Shanghai, 
China and six days in Japan, conducting surveys about the mutual perceptions in 
these two nations, especially for the up-to-date Chinese public opinion on 
Sino-Japanese relations. The questionnaire has covered several crucial issues 
including the Senkaku island dispute, the Nanjing Massacre and the Yasukuni Shrine 
Visit. Moreover, other than these necessary standard questions in such a survey, it also 
includes questions about how the people of each nation perceive the people of the 
other. The survey in China totally collects 123 effective samples out of 130 surveys 
(Business 48 Freelancer 6 Scholars 3 Students 46 Others 20). 75% of the interviewees 
are males. 90% of the interviewees range from 18-45 years old.37 Most of the 
questions designed are quite similar to those surveys conducted by the major news 
agencies in Japan and China.38 Moreover, I will also compare the result of my 
surveys with the past surveys’. Such a comparison is important, as Sino-Japanese 
                                                        
37 See Appendices for details. 
38 The most well-known related surveys are from Asahi Shinbun (2002,2003), Yomuiri Shinbun 
(2003), and Chinese Social Sciences Academy(2002-2004).  
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relations are said to improve considerably after 2005, and accordingly testing whether 
there has been a coherent variation in the public opinion could be essential to my 
research. Nevertheless, my surveys have also added some updated questions directly 
related to the case study of the 2007 Fukuda visit. Chapter Five will address most of 
the results.  
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
     
Political psychology is a multi-disciplinary field that has developed for more than 
thirty years. “What unifies political psychology and makes it distinct from other 
forms of political analysis is the search for explanation, description, and prediction at 
the individual level of analysis.”39 The individual level of analysis informs and 
affects the kinds of questions that are asked, the forms of evidence that are sought, 
and the natures of inferences about causality that are made by political psychologists. 
“Not just limited to the individual level, it also provides a particularly humanistic 
slant on politics, asserting the importance of psychological processes to political 
outcomes, by extending to organizational, bureaucratic, international and other levels 
of analysis”.40 Nevertheless, there are still some central questions or limitations of 
political psychology as a developing approach. Some argue that it is too insensitive to 
political demands and pressures. “In attempting to introduce psychological 
                                                        
39 See Rober Jervis Perception and misperception in international politics (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, c1976). 
40 Rose McDermott, Political psychology in international relations, (Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, c2004). p.3. 
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explanations into political analysis, many political psychologists inadvertently (or 
otherwise) end up privileging psychological processes over political realities”.41 The 
other crucial question involves the extent to which findings from controlled 
experiment in a psychological laboratory can be applied to real-world decision 
making.42 
Despite the work on the political psychology approach, my research still has 
several other limitations that need to be highlighted. First of all, although the chosen 
trauma literature gives us a fresh thinking about the case of China-Japan relations, its 
application would be more precise if relevant experiments in China are possible based 
on sufficient time and funding. Due to the practical limits of a Master’s research, this 
thesis can hardly provide enough detailed psychological analysis consistent with my 
scope. Hopefully the future Ph.D. study could offer more chances to make up for the 
absence of a well-designed experiment. 
Moreover, as I have little access to the real policy making and media agenda 
setting process, the research also lacks specific data of how the state officials and 
media editors actually think and act on the issue. Nevertheless, the specific data 
collected from the Chinese mass media from 1949 to 2007, the analysis of the 
mutual-perception surveys held by various Chinese and Japanese institutions, and the 
surveys in my field trip would hopefully be sufficient to reflect the popular opinion 
on Sino-Japanese relations and its interaction with the state and media.  
                                                        
41  Fred I. Greenstein Personality and politics; problems of evidence, inference, and 
conceptualization (Chicago, Markham Pub. Co. 1969). 
42  See Fred I. Greenstein Personality and politics; problems of evidence, inference, and 
conceptualization (Chicago, Markham Pub. Co. 1969). Robert Jervis, Political Psychology: Some 
Challenges and Opportunities. Political Psychology No.10 (1989). pp. 481-93. 
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ORGANIZATIONS OF THESIS 
 
My thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter defines the research questions, 
gives a brief introduction to the theoretical framework and literature review, and 
indicates the general argument.  
In Chapter Two, I will introduce the reconciliation framework in the first section 
to interpret the predicament of contemporary China-Japan relations. After that, I will 
highlight the unique and pivotal role of collective memory in such a framework. 
Finally, I will further elaborate the chosen trauma factor in the Chinese collective 
psychology in dealing with Sino-Japanese relations.  
Combined with the literature review of the three parts above, I will also shed 
light on the literature of Chinese nationalism as well as some similar research in this 
field in terms of both their strengths and weaknesses. Despite the persuasive and 
insightful part of the nationalism literature, it seems still inadequate to enunciate the 
real causes of the strong anti-Japanese sentiment in China and its implications for 
Sino-Japanese Relations. Almost all the scholars in this area tend to combine the 
analysis of China-U.S. relations with China-Japan relations, which may mistakenly 
confuse the endeavors for regaining national identity and pride with the pursuit of 
historical justice and the remembering of the traumatic past. 
Chapter Three, focusing on the different patterns of the three actors in dealing 
with Sino-Japanese relations, will be composed of two parts. The first part addresses 
the history from 1949 to the 1980s and in particular the period from 1972; the second 
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part examines the situation from 1980s till today. With such a division of time frame, 
I will not only show the different role of each actor, but also analyze the interactions 
among the state, media and public. From a top-down chosen glory, to a conditioned 
collective amnesia, and finally a strong nationalistic and history sensitive memory, 
there has gradually been a larger gap of perceptions between the state and public, 
with the media intermediating with their needs and voices at different times. This 
chapter will apply the chosen trauma perspective to the historical evolvement of 
China-Japan relations. 
With three specific case studies, Chapter Four will further elaborate the chosen 
traumas affecting the Chinese perception on Japan as well as its influence on their 
real behavior. From 1998 Jiang Zemin visit, 2003 New Thinking, to the 2007 Fukuda 
visit, this chapter will provide more empirical evidence to support the argument. 
Jiang’s visit explains how the chosen traumas throughout the state and public could 
dramatically hinder the normal bilateral meeting and the negotiation on a few 
strategic priorities. The New Thinking case can help us understand the way chosen 
traumas affect the public perception and behavior in response to a fresh idea 
significantly contradicting people’s established mindset. Finally, the Fukuda visit will 
further elaborate the degree to which chosen traumas root in people’s psychological 
scheme, by contrast with the actual efforts made between the two governments. 
Chapter Five will be the final conclusion. 
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This chapter will firstly address the way traumas take part in characterizing collective 
memory by linking the past to the present political issues. Furthermore, it will 
highlight the role of shared memory influencing the truth of history and justice that 
are essential to the reconciliation process. With a general literature review regarding 
reconciliation, memory study, and chosen traumas, this chapter will explain the 
interconnections among these different factors.  
From a reconciliation-memory-trauma framework, I will try to position the 
chosen trauma factor in the variations determining Sino-Japanese relations. The major 
problem of the stagnant Sino-Japanese relations should be attributed to the failure of 
reconciliation. Such a failure is more of the inability to deal with the past, precisely 
the traumatic memory, than the failure to settle the contemporary issues. This chapter 
will provide a clearer picture about why a political psychology perspective is 
analytical and insightful in the study of China-Japan relations. In addition, I will also 
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MEMORY AND RECONCILIATION 
 
Inquiries into shared memory have been considerably influential in the study of 
identity politics and stimulating the possible proliferation of inter-group tension, 
conflicts, and even hostilities. By contrast with the existing literature elucidating the 
German-Jewish, Bosnian-Kosovar, and other historically ethnical or national conflicts, 
it is still uncommon to analyze the psychological schemes of the Chinese on 
China-Japan relations. 
Comparing with these scenarios, this paper will claim that the Chinese memory 
of traumas related to Sino-Japanese relations has always been indeterminate and 
contestable. Hence it is equally likely to be controlled by state manipulation, in the 
name of nationalism, as it is employed in the opposition as a challenge to the 
dominant official narratives.43 The role of trauma is thus also vital to the influence of 
memory on contemporary international politics. A collective memory with trauma and 
another without are distinctively different as they could fundamentally determine how 
a nation perceives relations with another. 
The belief that the way groups of people perceive the past shapes the nature of 
political communities is far from novel. John Stuart Mill, Alexis de Tocqueville and 
Ernest Renan all identify the necessity of a community of recollections as a perquisite 
for the development of a strong sense of nationality and emphasize the importance of 
                                                        
43 Peter Gries has established a scholarly perspective about the “state nationalism” and “popular 
nationalism” in contemporary China, in particular concerning the Sino-Japanese relations. “The 
dominant narratives” refer to “official ideology” and the later “state nationalism”. 
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forgetting in order to provide a sense of longevity and continuity. Moreover, an 
increasing number of International Relations scholars have also investigated the role 
of collective identity to explain the composition of national interests, the development 
of foreign policy positions and the evolution of international norms and institutions.44 
Thus it will be inadequate to investigate national interests without understanding how 
they are shaped by certain values and norms of societies, including the memory of 
past historical events. 
Some of the observers in this field of China-Japan relations have tried to shed 
light on an overarching framework of reconciliation.45 Such a framework mainly 
focuses on the way two former enemies attempt to reconcile the past and is largely 
composed with an acknowledgement of wrongdoing, acceptance of legal and moral 
responsibility, retribution, apologies and forgiveness. Other key elements of 
reconciliation, particularly concerning Sino-Japanese relations, include shared 
collective memory, healing of the grief, sorrow and sense of victimhood, apology, 
public trials, education, and joint projects.46 The reconciliation between two parties is 
not guaranteed and is prone to setbacks and numerous obstacles as the case of China 
and Japan highlights. In addition, Rose indicates such patterns as the “memory boom”, 
the “rush for restitution”, and the “age of apology” that can contribute to explain the 
situations whereby China and Japan have tried, and in what instances failed to come 
to terms with the past. Nonetheless, just as she admits in the same chapter, there is no 
                                                        
44 See Peter Katzenstein, 1996; Friedrich Kratochwil and Yosel Lapid, 1996; Alexander Wendt, 
1999. 
45  See Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future? 
(RoutledgeCurzon, c2005) 
46 See Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub, Patriotism, (Wadsworth Publishing, 1999). 
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single, ideal model for reconciliation and in some cases reconciliation is impossible to 
achieve.47 
In light of the broad framework of reconciliation, it is also understandable that all 
the strategic concerns from the perspective of rational choice, including the prominent 
disputes over territory and resources, the role of USA and Taiwan, and many other 
economic issues, are also essential in the array of variables. Moreover, the profound 
social and political changes that have engaged in the post-war history of China and 
Japan, particularly the relaxation of ideology and the transformation of state-society 
dynamics, have equally played a pivotal role in determining the trend of 
Sino-Japanese relations.  
On the other hand, the failure of China and Japan’s increasing economic 
interdependence to prevent rising political tensions illuminates the significance of 
non-economic factors and the troubled and often violent mutual interactions. Even the 
benefits of economic cooperation cannot neutralize Chinese emotions of historical 
grievances or ensure smooth political relations. The Chinese government cannot 
afford to make concessions on bilateral controversies on the grounds of economic 
interests. “This does not mean the government would not take ad hoc measures to 
limit the economic damages of political disputes, but the concerns about public 
opposition still preclude any bold diplomatic moves that would generate a 
harmonious mutual perception.”48 For example, in 2003, when a new high-speed 
                                                        
47  Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future? 
(RoutledgeCurzon, c2005) 
48 Yinan He, History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,, Journal of 
Contemporary China, Volume 16, Number 50, February, 2007, p. 19 
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railroad project was ready to accept the technology support from Japan’s Shinkansen, 
strong public pressure expanded through the Internet warning about the consequences 
of such a decision. As a result, the deal was not made and the Vice Foreign Minister 
Wu Dawei disclosed the real reason: “We are facing high anti-Japanese sentiment in 
China. If our government adopts the Shinkansen technique in the railway project, the 
people would have opinions.”49 
Nevertheless, the majority of the reconciliation research still largely neglects the 
psychological basis that can be and actually has been internalized through the 
reconciliation practice between China and Japan. For example, in the insightful work 
of Yinan He, 50  she points out the national mythmaking in the history of 
Sino-Japanese relations and how it created the different patterns of dilemmas of the 
state, media and public. She also highlights the importance of a shared memory with 
regard to the reconciliation. Nevertheless, without digging deeply into the collective 
psychology and the identity factor on the Chinese side, her conclusion just seems 
relatively pale and stereotyped, contending that a healthy dialogue between the 
historians of China and Japan and more cooperative historical research can gradually 
wipe off the shade of trauma.  
Fueling nationalism and exacerbating a mutual threat perception, the collective 
psychology factor could catalyze the possible conflict in other hard issues, i.e. island 
disputes, maritime oil competition and even the Taiwan problem. Rose also points out 
                                                        
49 Taipei Times, (31 December 2004). 
50 Yinan He, History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,, Journal of 
Contemporary China, Volume 16, Number 50, February, 2007. 
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that certain “collective amnesia”51 was obviously evident in this case and the action 
of seeking, remembering and uncovering truth in both China and Japan has still been 
profoundly dominating people’s memory of the traumatic past. Reconciliation 
requires basic psychological changes in large segments of both groups. Some scholars 
also suggest that the process of reconciliation, to be effective, requires collective 
healing, and even forgiveness of the adversary’s misdeeds. 52  For the hope of 
reconciliation, often between two previously antagonistic communities, mourning and 
remembrance have naturally become an essential part as memory continues to 
circumscribe the reconciliation. Exploring the case of Kosovo, for example, Larry 
Ray demonstrates the problems of “dwelling on, and in, the past by identifying the 
danger of how commemoration may take the form of melancholia whereby grief and 
anger predominate”.53  
 
TRAUMA VS. NATIONALISM 
 
Unlike the studies on how memory shapes people’s political perceptions and 
behaviors, I will mainly explore the traumatic memory from the psychology literature, 
extending from the individual level to the collective level. Memory, whether accurate 
or otherwise, is a potent ingredient in the brew of factors that, when combined, 
                                                        
51 See Rigby, A. Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
2001). 
52 See Asmal et al., 1997; Bar Tal, 2001; Kriesberg, 1998a; Lederach, 1997; Arthur, 1999; Hayner, 
1999; Lederach, 1998; Staub & Pearlman, 2001; Ervin Staub and Daniel Bar-Tal, 2004. 
53 Larry Ray, Mourning, melancholia and violence in F.M. Fierke, Social Memory, Trauma and 
International Relations, Chapter in Memory, Trauma and World Politics, (New York : Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006). p.137. 
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constitute the evolving relationship between China and Japan. Thus the assumption of 
the analysis of this paper is that habitual memory shapes the interactions of certain 
countries with other countries. The re-enactment of the traumatic past takes an 
important role in a relationship between countries.54  
Furthermore, the hurt and resentments are reproduced from generation to 
generation into the future-a future that is determined by the remembered past.55 In 
this conception, memory substantially denies the past of its objects and instead insists 
on their continuing presence. A memory once established defines an eternal truth and 
identity for members of a certain group.56 As Duncan Bell points out, memory is not 
always beneficial; it can be counter-productive. It can obstruct the potential for 
moving forward, for envisaging alternative futures.57  
In Figure 2.2, it indicates the interconnection of the key variables of my study 







                                                        
54 F.M. Fierke, Social Memory, Trauma and International Relations, Chapter in Memory, Trauma 
and World Politics, (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). p.131. 
55 Peter, Novick, The Holocaust and Collective Memory (London: Bloomsbury, 1999), p.4. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Duncan, Bell, Memory, Trauma and World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 
p.24. 
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Figure 2.2 How chosen traumas pattern Sino-Japanese relations 
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Gries defines “nationalism” as referring to any behavior designed to restore, maintain, 
or advance public images of that national community. He also assesses on how the 
nationalistic public opinion in China could pose some significant constraints on the 
diplomatic policy establishment of the government. His persuasive argument has 
actually been well proven by the case of China-Japan relations.58 Moreover, he also 
argues that central to the Chinese nationalism is the superiority of Confucian 
civilization. In addition to Gries’ identification of China’s new nationalism, Yongnian 
Zheng’s distinction between popular and official nationalism is also worth attention in 
that he asserts about how nationalism could become a double-edged sword.59 Segal 
argues that Chinese nationalism has developed from an affirmative to an assertive 
position, while S.Zhao interprets it as a “situational” and “defensive” reaction to 
external challenges.60  
Despite the persuasive and insightful part of the nationalism literature, it seems 
still inadequate to enunciate the real causes of the strong anti-Japanese sentiment in 
China and its implications for Sino-Japanese Relations. Almost all the scholars in this 
area tend to combine the analysis of Sino-American relations with Sino-Japanese 
relations. It may mistakenly confuse the determination for regaining national identity 
and pride with the pursuit of historical justice and the remembering of the traumatic 
                                                        
58 See Peter, Gries and Rosen, Stanley. Ed. State and society in 21st century China: crisis, 
contention, and legitimation. (New York: Routledge. 2004). 
59 Zheng, Yongnian, Nationalism, Globalism, and China's International Relations in Weixing Hu, 
Gerald Chan, Daojiong Zha China's international relations in the 21st century: dynamics of 
paradigm shifts. (Lanham: University Press of America, 2000.) 
60 See David S. G. Goodman, Gerald Segal China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence The 
China Journal, No. 45 (Jan., 2001), pp.226-228.  Zhao S. Chinese intellectuals quest for national 
greatness and nationalistic writing in the 1990s, China Quarterly, 152, (1997) pp.725-45.  
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past. In other words, regarding the noticeably different motivations and backgrounds 
of the anti-American and anti-Japanese emotions, it would be questionable about 
whether it is still appropriate to use the same Chinese nationalism to fully investigate 
the whole picture.  
Equally important, the Chinese nationalism literature also tends to overemphasize 
the state-society mechanism including the democratization appeal and the partially 
harsh voice of a renascent Chinese empire. Such an oversimplification runs the risks 
on overly stressing the state legitimacy reborn from the debris of the withering old 
ideology of Marxism and Maoism and thus misinterprets the uniqueness of 
Sino-Japanese relations. For example, the anti-Japanese slogans that accompanied 
virtually every democratic movement in post-Mao China have been oversimplified as 
“anti-regime manifestations” or “expressing the sentiment that today’s rulers of the 
Chinese state are in fact traitors to the Chinese nation”.61 Apparently, such claims are 
vulnerable to the accusation of indiscriminately applying the interpretation of 
nationalism to contemporary China-Japan relations. 
   Finally, Chinese nationalism has been characterized as xenophobic, anti-Western, 
anti-American, potentially irredentist, and even dangerously chauvinistic and 
war-prone. 62  Other scholars, meanwhile, have applied the concepts of “racial 
                                                        
61 Edward, Friedman. National identity and democratic prospects in socialist China. (Armonk, 
N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. 1995). 
62 See Lucian.Pie, “After the Collapse of Communism: The Challenge of Chinese Nationalism 
and Pragmatism”, in Eberhard Sandschneider (ed.), The Study of Modern China, London: Hurst & 
Co., 1999, pp.31-51; Edward Friedman, “Still Building the Nation: The Causes and Consequences 
of China’s Patriotic Fervor”, in Shiping Hua (ed.), Chinese Political Culture, 1989-2000, Armonk, 
NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001, pp.103-132. 
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nationalism”, and “face nationalism”, in their studies of Chinese nationalism.63 While 
such a conventional focus on state nationalism in this field of literature is not 
unwarranted, it tends to overstate the influence of the party-state and its intellectual 
supporters in shaping Chinese nationalism. To some extent, rising nationalism could 
constrain the party-state’s foreign policy options. Due to the authoritarian nature of 
China’s political system, however, the party-state ultimately has the power to restrain 
any radical mobilization of nationalists. On the other hand, the extent of state-society 
relations is not only influenced by the nationalistic expression, but also affected by 
the changing socio-economic conditions, the relaxation of ideology, and people’s 
changing perception upon their living environment as well as their group identity. 
Chinese nationalism, under many circumstances, is far from the only or most crucial 
source of all the problems encroaching CCP’s legitimacy or altering its foreign policy 
strategy. Rather than seeking a single lodestone of the PRC legitimacy, analysts 
should focus on context: “certain events make certain claims salient at certain 
times”.64 
 
CHOSEN TRAUMAS: DEFINITIONS 
Chosen Traumas is a mental representation that is transmitted at a trans-generational 
                                                        
63 See Barry Sautman, “Racial Nationalism and China’s External Behavior”, World Affairs, Vol. 
160, No.2 (Fall 1997), p.78-95. Peter Gries, “A China Threat? Power and Passion in Chinese 
‘Face Nationalism’”, World Affairs, Vol. 162, No.2 (Fall 1999), pp.63-75. 
64 Peter Gries, Popular nationalism and state legitimation in China, Peter, Gries and Rosen, 
Stanley. (ed.) State and society in 21st century China: crisis, contention, and legitimation. (New 
York: Routledge. 2004).p181. 
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level of past historical events. “Within virtually every large group there exists a 
shared mental notion of a traumatic past event during which the large group suffered 
loss and experienced helplessness, shame and humiliation in conflict with another 
large group. The trans-generational transmission of such a shared traumatic event is 
linked to the past generation’s inability to mourn losses of people, land or prestige, 
and indicates the large group’s failure to reverse narcissistic injury and humiliation 
inflicted by another large group, usually a neighbor”. Chosen glories, on the contrary, 
means the mental representations of past shared successful events that lift up the large 
group’s self esteem.65 
In Figure 4.2, it shows the process of how chosen traumas can be created, 
reshaped, passed, oppressed, reactivated and fermented, under the circumstance of a 
state-state conflict. With a trans-generational transmission, the trauma will change its 
function from a simple historical fact to an ethnical marker imprinted on the national 
identity of a large group. Furthermore, the reactivation of chosen traumas will serve 
as a channel to link the past traumas to the current political events. Such a 
past-to-present mechanism will therefore further foster people’s hatred and 
resentment for getting even, and considerably magnify the significance of present 
political conflicts. Finally, such a trauma imprisonment may boil down to irrational 
decision making, and even large group mobilization. 
 
 
                                                        
65 Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of 
Large-Group Identity. Group Analysis, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001) p.80. 
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Chosen traumas is a concept developed from individual psychoanalysis to a group 
or social memory study and essentially fills up the distinction between unconscious 
and conscious based on a conditioned social and political environment. This paper 
illustrates how chosen traumas are related to the complex variation and motivations of 
the Chinese in dealing with contemporary Sino-Japanese relations. Hence the state 
ideological narrative and the public story telling will be incorporated into one 
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CHOSEN TRAUMAS: HYPOTHESES 
 
Chosen traumas act like a fuel to maintain large-group conflicts, even if the 
conflicts have their origins in economic, legal, political or military controversy. Since 
a large group does not choose to be victimized or to suffer humiliation, some take 
exception to the term “chosen” traumas. Volkan believes that it reflects a large 
group’s “choice” to add a past generation’s representation of an event to its own 
identity, and the fact that, while groups may have experienced any number of traumas 
in their history, only certain ones remain live over centuries.66  
The first hypothesis is that the representation of history in the chosen traumas is 
closely bound up with the foundation of each group member’s identity. Hence the 
chosen traumas in Sino-Japanese relations are difficult to pin down vis-à-vis specific 
events because they are not simply connected to one well-recognized past historical 
event. As far as the political aspect is concerned, the memory of trauma has 
transcended from a pure historical fact to an essential part of a nation’s group identity. 
Such an identity, based on suspicion, resentment and hatred, will crucially blind the 
Chinese public from viewing Japan from a second angle. China’s political discourse 
repeatedly refers to the idea of China as subject to hostile external and internal 
predators.67 It to some extent smolders with other traumas that have been inflicting 
the self-esteem identity of the Chinese and therefore calls for a renascent one 
                                                        
66 Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of 
Large-Group Identity. Group Analysis, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001) p.80. 
67 Cao, Q. (with Renwick, N.) Modern Political Communication in China In G. Rawnsley & M. 
Rawnsley (eds) Political Communication in Greater China: The Construction and Reflection of 
Identity, pp. 62-82, London & New York: Routledge Curzon 2003. 
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saturated with strong nationalism.  
Another crucial hypothesis is that the government once artificially mixed the 
resurrection of chosen traumas with chosen glories in dealing with Sino-Japanese 
relations. By chosen glories, it refers to the mental representations of past shared 
successful events that lift up the large group's self-esteem.68 This is not to say that 
historical research was not underway or that the wound of the war was not discussed 
at all. On the contrary, the Communist Party’s grand narrative in which the 
Communists were victorious in the anti-Japanese war became the mainstay of the 
party’s legitimacy, forming the core of the country’s collective memory and identity.69 
It is important to recognize that chosen traumas are much stronger ethnic or 
large-group markers than chosen glories. Reviewing how the CCP fought against the 
Japanese troops or recalling the glorious ancient Chinese history cannot raise the 
national spirit as much as the anti-Japanese sentiment or nationalism.  
Moreover, chosen traumas would not be stationary and unchangeable through all 
times. Quite on the contrary, it will gradually evolve from a notion of historical myth 
to a motivation to get revenge in the present life under the name of truth or justice. 
Individual participants in the dialogue of Sino-Japanese relations, regardless of his or 
her personal organization, professional or social standing, or even political orientation, 
may feel that his or her side, i.e., China, should discharge the sense of humiliation 
                                                        
68 Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of 
Large-Group Identity. Group Analysis, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001): 80. 
69 Cao, Q. (with Renwick, N.) Modern Political Communication in China In G. Rawnsley & M. 
Rawnsley (eds) Political Communication in Greater China: The Construction and Reflection of 
Identity, pp. 62-82, London & New York: Routledge Curzon 2003, p.1. 
 
  - 33 -
through oppressing Japan and become its spokesperson. This psychological notion 
can decipher the strong emotional expression about Sino-Japanese relations on the 
Internet and the growing negative statistics according to the mutual perception polls. 
The effect of the past traumatic memory would make people impelled to 
inadvertently link the present political issues to the past history, and thus distort their 
perceptions on contemporary politics by overusing the mirror of history. Such an 
intricate past-to-present scheme will therefore make the public more rejected to 
disconfirming information contradictory to their established mindset toward Japan. 
Volkan also provides us an appropriate concept to explain the interaction of the 
contemporary events of Sino-Japanese relations with people’s accumulative chosen 
traumas, i.e., a “time collapse”. When a chosen trauma is fully awakened within a 
large group by stressful and anxiety-inducing circumstances (for example, the 
memorial anniversary of 918 incident, the Yasukuni visit, or other random but 
influential events posing a negative sense), a time collapse typically occurs.70 This 
term refers to the fears, expectations, fantasies and defenses associated with a chosen 
trauma that reappears when both conscious and unconscious connections are made 
between the mental representation of the past trauma and a contemporary threat. This 
process magnifies the image of current enemies and current conflicts, and an event 
that occurred centuries ago will be felt as if it happened yesterday. An old enemy will 
be perceived as a new enemy, and the sense of entitlement to regain what was lost, or 
                                                        
70 Volkan, Vamik D. Transgenerational Transmissions and Chosen Traumas: An Aspect of 
Large-Group Identity. Group Analysis, Vol. 34, no. 1, (2001): 80. 
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to seek revenge against the contemporary enemy, becomes exaggerated. 71  By 
invoking the past humiliations, the party could also be determined to prevent the same 
from happening again. Such preventing them from happening again propaganda, 
which has been the pivotal element of the Chinese state and official media discourse, 
as well as the traditional historical value of the Chinese culture (Yi Shi Wei Jian), 
naturally attached any present incident with the historical lessons. Many of the 
current actions of the Japanese government, such as the conflict with China over the 
Senkaku Island and Japan’s bid for UNSC, would easily be regarded as the 
reappearance of what happened in the 1930s and thus be considered as a sign of a 
reviving Japanese militarism. 
One inconspicuous but indispensable factor is that most of the leaders and 
officials in the Chinese government who are the decision makers of Sino-Japanese 
relations are also part of the public. In other words, the leaders and officials 
themselves do have their own chosen traumas on Japan also. Even though one could 
argue that their primary concern is still centering on how to lead Sino-Japanese 
relations to a direction that will maximize China’s strategic interests, their own 
chosen traumas determine that it is fairly difficult for them to explore certain 
pragmatic and innovative ways to change the status-quo and to truly break the 
deadlock. In the Jiang Zemin era, some Japanese analysts argue that Jiang’s reasons 
for dwelling so much on the history problem had much more to do with an attempt to 
score points at home than a genuine desire to resolve the problem.72 
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Moreover, chosen traumas may or may not be readily evident at all times; it may 
lie dormant for a long period of time. Through the deliberate framing of the state and 
official media, little space was available for the massive investigation on war crimes. 
Nonetheless, through the change of time and ideology, as well as the relaxation of 
media control, the chosen traumas on Sino-Japanese relations can be reactivated to 
exert a powerful psychological force on the Chinese again. The chosen traumas could 
become more influential with a period of dormancy and repression.  
   Last but not the least, not only will chosen traumas significantly influence the 
reconciliation regarding the strategic concerns, but also constrain the possibility for 
understanding different sides and the complexity of Sino-Japanese relations . In that 
sense, it may cause considerable discrepancies among different actors regarding their 
views, beliefs and behavior. Such a fixation on particular grievances will make it 
impossible to accept opposite points of view. Differently put, while certain actor in 
the case of Sino-Japanese relations has shown the intention to drive the relationship 
realistically, the chosen traumas will make it difficult for other actors to understand 
the motivation. Far from a uni-dimensional constant, the chosen trauma factor will 
vary differently among different actors.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
(RoutledgeCurzon, c2005), p.106. 
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CHAPTER THREE: STATE-MEDIA-PUBLIC INTERACTIONS 




Next two chapters will pay more attention to the state-media-public interaction 
dynamics. Crucial to the application of chosen traumas to China-Japan relations, the 
analysis of such interaction can systematically explain why certain memories become 
amnesiac at some times, repressed, or reenacted at others. Moreover, I will divide the 
time frame after 1972 into two parts and try to interpret the evolution of chosen 
traumas based on the historical evolvement of China’s perception on Japan. The first 
will be about the dormancy period from 1949 to the early 1980s when the chosen 
traumas were initially suppressed. The second will be the period from 1980s till today, 
concentrating on the activation and evolution of chosen traumas and its variations 
among the three actors.  
 
THE STATE-MEDIA-PUBLIC DYNAMICS ON CHOSEN TRAUMAS 
 
Initially, the Chinese state tried to get some political credit for the progress of the 
relationship with Japan, such as mutual visits of top leaders to demonstrate diplomatic 
triumph. On the other hand, the authoritative nature of the Chinese government and 
its persistent intense control over free speech and media has largely fostered its 
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neglect over the chosen traumas deeply rooted in the public. Nevertheless, it was the 
government itself that reawakened the anti-Japanese sentiment ever since the 1982 
history textbook issue73 and confected state-to-state agendas exemplified by the 
Yasukuni Shrine visit. Propaganda that the state produced to maintain the general 
perception of Sino-Japanese relations among the public is passively lost in the pattern 
between interest-based choices and the chosen traumas that the state wove itself. On 
one hand, it is obligated to consider the implications from other aspects such as 
economic factors, the Taiwan issue, and other strategic variations. On the other hand, 
it has to distinguish the concerns for the above aspects from the historical issues and 
the strong but still intangible public opinion. For that reason, in all the cases covering 
Sino-Japanese relations since 1972, the Chinese government has always been in a 
relatively passive position to pick up its cards in response to Japan’s moves.  
As far as the media is concerned, the Chinese mass media is under the full-scale 
control, if not as strict as it used to be, of the government. Despite the liberalization 
trend, Chinese mass media are still being heavily censored. Although the leaders have 
acknowledged the organic connection between the reduced ability to control 
communications flows and the basic line of the post-Mao economic reform and 
opening, the party has been struggling to reassert its control over media reports.74 
                                                        
73 The Japanese history textbook controversies are about government-approved history textbooks 
used in the secondary education (junior high schools and high schools) of Japan. The 
controversies primarily concern what some international observers perceive to be a systematic 
distortion of the historical record propagated in the Japanese educational system, which seeks to 
whitewash the wrongdoings of Imperial Japan during WWII. Kathleen Woods Masalski 
(November 2001). "Examining the Japanese History Textbook Controversies". Stanford Program 
on International and Cross-Cultural Education. Retrieved on 2008-10-11. 
74 Daniel C. Lynch , After the propaganda state : media, politics, and "thought work" in reformed 
China, (Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press, c1999.), p.177 
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Most evident is its emphasis on “thought work”, “the importance of political 
consciousness”, as well as the strict media censoring system, from central media to 
local ones.75 Compared with the content of media outlets at the provincial level and 
especially at the sub-provincial, which may have relatively more autonomy, the 
content of the central outlets generally adheres to political correctness. It is not 
surprising given the fact that Beijing’s propaganda cadres monitor the central outlets 
relatively easily and directly appoint the outlets’ leading personnel.76 The problem, 
however, is that Chinese citizens no longer need to consume the offering of the 
central media as they had no choice but to do under the communication compression 
of the Maoist propaganda state. Today the Chinese people have a much wider variety 
of message sources from which to choose.77 Thus the public would not necessarily 
lay too much account on these reports, whether in broadcasting, print, or 
telecommunications, to know exactly the information in depth about Sino-Japanese 
relations.  
Nevertheless, both the increasing influence of financial considerations and in 
consequence the inevitable needs to cover the stories from multi-dimensional views 
have made things flexible. Thus the official view would have to adjust accordingly if 
the state hopes its propaganda can still maneuver the public opinion on the 
China-Japan issue. Likewise, the media editors or reporters are able to absorb 
different comments and points from scholars, net surfers and even western media.78 
                                                        
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid. p139. 
77 Ibid.  
78  Zhang Weiguo, Reporters and Editors on the Mainland Fight for a Larger Margin of 
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In fact the various ways to report international affairs have been accepted and 
welcomed by most audience, which will make the official central government 
discourse even less adorable to people. Moreover, advocating patriotism could be the 
safest language for the social elites or intellectuals to openly promote their own 
political agenda regarding diplomatic policies. Consequently, in such a half-open yet 
still intensely monitored media system, nationalist sentiment, expressed by tabloid 
writers, freelancers and even influential academics, have flourished.79 
The problem of chosen traumas is not so much that people are condemned to 
relieve the past for failing to remember it, but more that the way of remembrance 
involves a compulsive attachment to unrelieved trauma. The mass media is the most 
important instrument that the government utilizes to awaken the chosen trauma of the 
public. It is also a potential and major means by which the Chinese public could 
discover and confront their chosen traumas through remembering and recalling. In 
dealing with the traumatic memory, the therapy has traditionally involved the 
transition from traumatic memory to narrative memory. 80  Nevertheless, the 
conventional therapy from an old psycho-analytical view is not enough to treat how 
people are trapped by the traumatic memory and recycle their negative feelings. 
Every time a Nanjing massacre victim tells his story on television bursting with tears, 
every time the Japanese soldiers in old uniforms appear on the screen, every time the 
picture of a new prime minister bowing in the Yasukuni Shrine is highlighted by the 
                                                        
79 Yinan He, History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict,, Journal of 
Contemporary China, Volume 16, Number 50, February, 2007, p. 18 
80 F.M. Fierke, Social Memory, Trauma and International Relations, Chapter in Memory, Trauma 
and World Politics, (New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
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lens or words, the chosen traumas are not only awakened, but reshaped and further 
solidified. 
Moreover, the financial concern, namely the viewship rate or circulation number, 
is also critical. The producers, journalists and editors realize that the coverage 
provoking anti-Japanese outrage is actually a high-profile and profit-related business. 
Hence the extensive focus on such reports and a considerable echo from the society is 
highly promising. Accordingly, neither the government propaganda nor the new 
thinking on Sino-Japanese relations raised by certain Chinese scholars is sufficient to 
change the public’s perception.  
If the Chinese government’s reaction is still a reflection irradiated by the chosen 
traumas, the public is indeed the driving force of the transmission of the traumas. 
Remembering is most often partially voluntary, spurred by some need or demand, and 
is determined by the signals and demands of the situations that trigger it.81 Forgetting, 
amnesia or dormancy is indeed the result of censorship, or more accurately repression, 
or more profoundly the overall social background in the history. The transmission of 
chosen traumas is not only the transmission from generation to generation but also 
from the social sphere into the psychic life and then back into social life through 
participation and expression. Considering most cases in contemporary Sino-Japanese 
relations, it is not difficult to argue that the chosen traumas of the public have been 
reawakened by the state, framed and modified by the mass media, and finally 
consolidated by the deep-seated memory in a trans-generational way. Even if the state 
                                                        
81 Stephan Feuchtwang Memorials to injustice in Duncan, Bell, Memory, Trauma and World 
Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). p.180 
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is able to be moderate between the strategic interests and the historical issue, the 
Chinese people have never learned to draw a clear line between past images and 
present scenarios. We can consider it as a state in which fear and hyper-vigilance 
become ingrained in the consciousness of most Chinese to treat any seemingly 
excessive movement of Japan as a signal of a reviving Japanese militarism. In that 
sense, it is reasonable to define the chosen traumas being dormant in the memory of 
the Chinese as the implicit trigger that led to the status-quo of the seemingly 
irreconcilable Sino-Japanese relationship. 
With the support of the new victim narrative, the reactivation of chosen traumas 
triggered the outpour of people’s emotions of self-pity and grievances. The majority 
of the public was thus preoccupied with a sense of suffering and felt little sympathy 
for Japan. Although the government and official media are still able to create a slogan 
of friendship, chances are slim for the public to backup a genuine Chinese friendship 
with Japan. Even if the public can be persuaded by immediate interests to be 
conciliatory and restrained, they would neither forget nor forgive the Japanese 
invasion; in the long run, their grievances against Japan would only explode with 
greater scale and intensity. Due to the strong grievances and humiliation boosted by 
the chosen traumas, the unconstrained public emotions can even politicize and 
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Table 3.2 Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations: 1982-2006 
 
1982 Jul.-Sep.  Textbook issue (also 1984 and 1986) 
1985 Aug.      PM Nakasone visits Yasukuni Shrine 
1989 Jun.      Tiananmen Square incident: Japan reluctant to isolate China 
1992 Oct.      Visit of Emperor Akihito to PRC 
1995 May      Chinese nuclear tests-Japan freezes aid 
1996 July      PM Hashimoto visits Yasukuni Shrine 
Sep.      Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute 
1997 Sep.      China protests about revised US-Japan Defence Guidelines 
1998 Nov.      Jiang Zemin visits Japan. 
2000 Oct.      Zhu Rongji visits Japan, adopts forward-looking stance on history 
2001 Apr.      China criticizes approval of The New History Textbook; Japan sends delegations to 
explain 
Aug.      PM Koizumi visit the Yasukuni Shrine (also Apr. 2002, Jan. 2003, Jan. 2004) 
Oct.       PM Koizumi visits China, visits Marco Polo Bridge and Anti-Japanese War Museum, 
offers “heart-felt apology” 
2002 Sep.      Ceremonies to mark the 30th anniversary of normalization 
2004 Mar.      The Senkaku Island dispute intensifies. 
July.      East China Sea oil despute  
Aug.      The Asian football cup final riot in Beijing. (Japan beats China winning the Champion) 
2005 Apr.      Anti-Japanese riots sweep the major cities in China. 
2006 Sep.      Abe Shinzo becomes New PM and visits China and ROK 
2007 Nov.      Fukuda Yasuo visits China 
 
THE DORMANCY PERIOD—FROM THE END OF THE WAR TO 
THE “HONEYMOON” 
Almost no dialogue about the war between China and Japan happened until the 
normalization. Even then, the issues of apology and reparations seemed to be resolved 
quickly and amicably. Such an expeditious resolution actually masked an intractable 
problem that would emerge in the 1980s and 1990s derived from the different ways in 
remembering history.82 From the birth of the PRC in 1949 to the end of the 1970s, 
                                                        
82 Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future? (Routledge 
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the frequency of press reporting on Japan was much less than what it has been since 
the reform and opening.83 The only image of the Japanese that the Chinese could get 
was the brutal Emperor soldiers speaking broken Mandarin mixed with annoying 
Japanese on the silver screen. War movies, the majority of which reflected how the 
Chinese army fought against the Japanese invaders, ubiquitously imposed this 
popular stereotype. In fact, due to the shortage of televisions during that period of 
time and the small quantity of the reports about Japan, the films became almost the 
only available source from which the Chinese public could be informed of Japan 
besides their memory of the anti-Japanese war.  
This distinct historical condition was predominant because the CCP endeavored 
to indoctrinate the ideology that it was the party that led the people to expel the 
enemies out of the country. Thus the CCP should absolutely possess the legitimacy of 
the new PRC and must be served as the only leader to bring back prosperity and 
strength to the country. Furthermore, regarding the war responsibility and the 
following compensation, which is actually an integral part of the process of 
reconciliation, the Chinese government held the so called twofold thinking. That is, 
criticizing the handful of Japanese militarists that inflicted suffering on the Chinese 
and Japanese people and are still continuing to distort historical facts and hurt the 
feelings of Chinese people. As a country and people, therefore, Japan and Japanese 
are not to be blamed. 
Focusing on replacing the hatred with selfless internationalism, not yet looking 
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forward to a reconciled Sino-Japanese relationship, the party underlined such thinking 
to consolidate the party legitimacy. The party strove to avoid awakening the 
nationalism as it would obscure the victory narrative and the proletarian 
internationalism of Marxist doctrine. As a result, much of the war memory was 
deliberately suppressed under the name of moving forward. Moreover, the remission 
of the war responsibility was also caused by the strategic pressure composed of the 
civil war and the external attainment to the fledgling communist regime, casting the 
needs to create a new sense of national identity and patriotism recovering from the 
memory of humiliation. For example, research on the Nanjing Massacre by Nanjing 
University academics was held “hostage to political ideology” in the 1960s, and was 
kept classified so as not to focus attention back on a time of weakness and invasion, 
thereby drawing away from China’s revolutionary progress.84 In addition, art works 
dwelling on human suffering were denounced as preaching defeatism or bourgeoisie 
humanitarianism. Most of the relevant literature investigating this particular period of 
time, unfortunately, has neglected the psychological impact that the state 
manipulation could impose on the cognitive framework of generations of Chinese, 
including the contemporary political leaders who lived their youth at the same time.85  
Despite that few disputes existed before the 1980s in China-Japan relations, this 
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period was essential in the establishment of the chosen traumas in China. The 
representation of history is contingent upon the demands of dominant elites and is 
written and rewritten according to the prevailing political structures of power. With 
regard to the state and mass media, the historical truth about the event is no longer 
important for the large group, but what is influential is that through sharing the 
chosen traumas, members of the group are linked together. Individuals might be 
inclined to adopt the interpretation close to that of the authorities, in order to survive 
and get accustomed to the new communist social environment. In that sense, the 
Chinese government utilized this scheme through the mass media propaganda at that 
time, to transform, instead of reawaken, the war memory into an intrinsic element of 
the national identity. 
The memory is grounded on cultural formations and artifacts such as ideological 
narratives, music, literature, poetry, drama, cinema, and the symbolic forms of flag, as 
well as memorial exhibitions and museums. This is consistent with much 
contemporary research on human memory. “People’s memories are not like computer 
files, retrieved from the unconscious, but are always constructed by combining bits of 
information selected and arranged in terms of prior narratives and current 
expectations, needs and beliefs”.86 We can define it as a temporary amnesia of 
traumas. Chosen traumas may lie dormant for a long period of time. Referring to the 
concept of collective amnesia,87 the older generation of Chinese people in fact 
                                                        
86 Martha, Minow, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law and Repair (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2002). p.74. 
87 See Rigby, A. Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
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suppressed their sense of suffering and humiliation towards Japan in response to the 
shifting situations including the four-year civil war, the birth of communist China at 
the threshold of Cold War, and the following dramatic political turbulences such as 
the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.  
On the other hand, objectively, because of the tightly controlled mass media at 
the time, Chinese people had no way to learn about Japan’s distortion of the war 
history such as the worship at the Yasukuni Shrine that later became the focal point of 
Sino-Japanese contentions. Most young Chinese had minimal knowledge about 
Japanese war atrocities as the textbook seldom mentioned the war crimes.  
Entering the 1980s, both the quantity and diversity of the reports on China-Japan 
relations experienced a boom thanks to the thawing of ideology. According to the 
volume of People’s Daily (the largest official press in China) 1995-2000, the number 
of the Japan reports kept constant from twenty to thirty per month, second only to the 
coverage about America.88 Furthermore, as to the content of Japan reports, it has 
achieved the variety of involving political, economic, cultural and technological 
levels. Based on the surveys examining the reports about Sino-Japanese relations of 
the leading press in China, People’s Daily covers the broadest range of issues and is 
certainly the most cautious one, focusing mainly on the diplomatic and military 
activities of Japan and the mutual visits between the leaders. Other provincial or city 
press paid equal attention to Japan’s economy, culture, sports and entertainment 
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Japan), http://www.comrc.com.cn/ 
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business.89  
In the political world, denial, rather than a function of unconscious repression, 
can be understood as a political act for the purpose of creating a unity of 
interpretation.90 Such denials usually concern pragmatic political concerns and the 
consequent alteration of the old narrative. It is crystallized with the honeymoon period 
between China and Japan in the early 1980’s.91 During that period of time, a highly 
positive attitude on Japan even outweighed the negative. At the state, this argument 
could best be supported by the slogan “Friendship forever between China and Japan” 
proposed by Premier Zhou Enlai when he met the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka in 
an effort to normalize the bilateral diplomatic relationship.92 This statement echoed 
the early comments made by Mao Zedong that China should put the unpleasant past 
aside and should stop repeatedly demanding an apology.93 Indeed, given the strategic 
importance of a solid bilateral relationship to confront the common Soviet threat, the 
two governments were happy to subdue contentions over the war history and other 
related issues such as reparations.  
After that, Deng Xiaoping restated the same opinion several times in 1982, 1984 
and 1987 when he met the Japanese political leaders.94 To some extent, this slogan 
propagated all over the country at that time. Even if Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao still 
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kept such political discourse alive, with the change of the situation, many additional 
bounds and modifiers have been appended. For example, “under the circumstance of 
facing the past and remembering the history”, “the friendship between the people of 
China and Japan” and “Japan should make more efforts to maintain the friendship 
between China and Japan”.95 The media were naturally and firmly in line with this 
principle. The fervor for certain Japanese TV dramas, movie stars and popular songs, 
which would seem absolutely unbelievable during the last decade, unexpectedly 
prevailed over the country. Thus the media played a major role in forming this flash 
in the pan, in terms of closely following the guidance from the government for the 
sake of policy needs.  
The catalyst of the honeymoon could be either the strategic reshuffle of China 
after splitting with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, or the demands of the domestic 
economic reform, because Japan’s economic wonder during that time was considered 
as a possible example that China could learn from when it just opened the gate and 
strove to materialize modernization. There have been ups and downs even within the 
reform period, however, with “a brief flush of enthusiasm in the 1979-81 period, a 
slight drop in 1982-84, a substantial revival in 1985-86, then achieving a plateau until 
the early 1990s, followed by another increase in interest in Japan”.96 These periods 
are not absolutely demarcated, nonetheless, and represent overlapping tendencies 
within a larger debate over the Japanese political economy, the Chinese political 
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economy and two countries’ broader relations.97  
On the other hand, the import of the fund, technology and direct investment from 
Japan was essential. As the top-down agendas to lift up the new patriotic spirit, the 
momentous 1982 controversy over the Japanese text book and the 1985 Yasukuni 
Shrine Visit dispute did not draw as much attention as the following problems after 
1995. Both the government and media tended to explore a more positive and valuable 
Japan rather than a country of war criminals’ unwillingness for apology according to 
its instant needs, namely the rapid economic development and an imperative reform. 
As much as a transition, yet still worth careful research, it may be possible to 
analyze this period with the rational choice explanation and government propaganda 
requirements. Nonetheless, a vital link is missed in the framework, i.e., the public, the 
public who had no effective avenues to express their will and opinion due to the strict 
ideological constraints. As a result, the absence of such a central factor made the 
problem more complicated after the 1990s when the situation appeared to take a 
sudden turn and worsened dramatically.  
According to Andrew Rigby’s view, we can identify three ideal-type modes for 
dealing with the past: forget it for the sake of peace and security, seek out the 
perpetrators in pursuit of justice, and acknowledge the suffering of the victims and 
their stories so that their truth might be known. 98  In the particular case of 
Sino-Japanese relations, people appear to partially forget the crime of the war under 
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the circumstance of party propaganda and proletarian ideology. Lastly, only when the 
scholars and intellectuals gained more autonomy and the media were entitled more 
free space did the massive investigation and concentrating reports begin to shed light 
on the specific crimes of the Japanese troops. On the surface, people have made 
considerable efforts to reconcile the relations but failed to satisfy the key 
requirements of it.  
Political denial can take many different forms and become a normal practice. The 
repression is less a matter of banning unwanted material to the individual awareness, 
than the repression of alternative interpretations of reality that would threaten the 
existing order.99 Over thirty years, however, it seemed the older generation that 
experienced the war was about to be a part of the past. Furthermore, after the reform 
and opening, both the national and international environment have allowed a more 
free space for the resurgence of the war memory, while the improvement of material 
life and national economy became the priority of the public and government. Under 
this situation, it provided the best ambience for eliciting the transgenerational 
identification with anti-Japanese sentiment and the activation of chosen traumas. By 
contrast with the old time when people somehow entered the amnesia, the whole 
nation finally realized it has still been in the post-trauma session of the war ended in 
1945. In a word, the memory of the anti-Japanese firmly imprinted the chosen 
traumas onto the Chinese identity, rather than distancing it as in the past. 
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THE REGRESSION UNDER THE RESULTANT FORCES—AFTER 
1989 
 
Since 1989, the Sino-Japanese relationship has experienced a huge setback, 
exacerbated by the fiftieth-anniversary commemoration of World War II in 1995 
when Japan and USA modified the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and 
the Yasukuni Shrine visit by Koizumi in 2001. The public attitude is edging toward a 
more stubborn and resentful position on Japan, while the state has to take a 
case-sensitive stance in dealing with the Beijing-Tokyo interaction. 1995 and 2001 
could be viewed as the watersheds whereby not only the degree of dwelling on the 
negative side of Japan significantly increased, but the anti-Japanese sentiment soared 
again and reached a peak in 2005 as well. It indicates that both the frequency of 
negative keywords and the proportion of the negative coverage on the main 
newspaper rocketed at the time.100 
 
STATE: AMBIVALENT AMONG MULTIPLE SIDES 
 
Looking at the state, the Tiananmen incident in 1989 had put China into a 
quandary of deteriorating relations with most western countries including Japan. 
Although the Emperor’s visit to China in 1992, the twentieth anniversary of the 1972 
normalization, seemed to detain the trend of deterioration, further conflicts, disputes 
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and problems still made the reconciliation rather unreal.  
During the 1990s, a new and popular victimization narrative superseded the 
official Maoist victor narrative.101 The so called Chinese nationalism for the purpose 
of prompting patriotism appeared to fill in the vacuum left by the fading communist 
ideology of Marxism and Maoism. By focusing on the patriotism, the regime could 
also divert the potential public discontentment away from some domestic issues. 
Moreover, the government also needed a new framework of ideas to strengthen 
intra-party consolidation, catering to the voice of the old conservative faction in the 
party, or to rallying the public support from the grassroots level. On the other hand, 
the state intention of proposing patriotism also unexpectedly evoked the chosen 
traumas and in consequence a prevalent anti-Japanese sentiment, as the economic 
reform had turned the Chinese society increasingly open and pluralistic. 
From a political psychology perspective, however, nationalism is an efficient 
way of repairing the rupture in collective memory brought about by the traumas. The 
patriotism campaign, as meant to instill nationalism to legitimize the state’s political 
dominance, has enhanced China’s identity as a country that was once victimized by 
Japan. Such a victim identity constitutes the core of the acknowledgement of chosen 
traumas. In fact, the representation of history in the chosen traumas is intimately 
bound up with the foundation of each group member’s identity. By no means could 
the Chinese government ignore all the new challenges as well as the importance of 
establishing a more cohesive national identity, whereas it still prioritized the 
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economic development, a stable regional environment and the continuity of the 
reform and opening.  
Moreover, the positive assessment of China’s strategic environment and the 
intention to take full advantage of a benign environment urges Beijing to avoid 
conflict with other countries, unless China’s core national interests are fundamentally 
challenged. Thus there comes up a saying that China tends to play history cards when 
confronting any economic conflict with Japan or the potential pressure from the 
Taiwan issue caused by the subtle change of the Japan-US alliance. This argument 
does make some sense when we try to understand the ups and downs of 
Sino-Japanese relations. By the late 1990s, however, when it became apparent that 
both governments were increasingly willing to put the history problem aside (or, 
more cynically, when they began to realize that the history card lacked the potency of 
previous years), they had to deal with the heightened expectations of people who had 
become accustomed to the government taking a hard stance on Japan. If the 
government adopts a too pragmatic stance, it runs the risk of being criticized for 
being weak.102 Ex-Premier Zhu Rongji once told a Japanese television audience 
during his October 2000 visit to Japan that he had received 200 letters criticizing him 
as being too soft on Japan after he told Japanese journalists before his visit that he 
would not make a big issue of history. 103  As the domestic and international 
atmospheres turned increasingly favorable to the war redress movement, it was 
difficult for the Chinese government to suppress the claims of the public.  
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Nevertheless, instead of relentlessly promoting nationalism, the Chinese 
government has actually taken great efforts to orchestrate the expressions of 
anti-Japanese sentiment to prevent them from disrupting the government’s overall 
foreign policy agenda. During the two Senkaku Island disputes in the 1990s, Beijing 
had to go out of its way to stop students and social activists from staging open 
protests against Japan.104 In both the visits of the Emperor in 1992 and the visit of 
Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto, the government mobilized cadres or drove the 
official media to dissuade the possible demonstration of students. 105  With the 
growing need for the party to accommodate popular nationalist demands for the sake 
of legitimacy, however, popular opinion has actually become an important 
consideration before the Foreign Ministry negotiates foreign policy. According to the 
interviews conducted by the Chinese media, each of the several heads of departments 
or bureaus in the ministry indicated that they check the Internet every day to seek 
what the public is concerned about and what the public wants.106 For that reason, the 
sensitivities to Chinese public opinion in the government are only likely to increase. 
State propaganda and public feelings are significantly different in many ways but also 
interconnected. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the former is strong enough to 
challenge the latter or fundamentally divert the general course of Sino-Japanese 
relations. As China’s mass media become more open to the transmission of 
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information about social resentment and unrest, the government cannot afford to 
ignore the public opinion transmitted by the media in its policy making. 
 
MEDIA: COMMERCIALIZING ON THE MARGIN 
 
The best way to have a clear picture of the state position on China-Japan relations 
is to understand the output of the Chinese mass media. Contemporary media 
technology, and mass cultural forms such as television and cinema, contains radical 
possibilities as they allow for the transmission across society of empathy for the 
historical experience of others.107 As to the chosen traumas, it is more than just how 
the next generation mimics the behavior of their parents or hears the stories they told 
them. In fact, in the collective political psychology, the media transmission element 
plays a crucial role in that no transmission of the event’s representation can take place 
unless it is associated with deposited self- and object-images, because these are the 
only representations that can pass from one generation to another. In general, the 
official media stood firmly on a position in line with the state discourse, while also 
trying to include the public agenda; the popular media often provided the background 
information that could excite a more nationalistic attitude towards Japan while 
alternating between the party line and the bottom line.  
Rather than a strictly top-down communication of political dogma, a more 
sophisticated media environment actually structured the image of Sino-Japanese 
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relations. History textbooks started to include detailed treatment of the KMT (Guo 
Min Dang) military campaigns against Japan, which were largely omitted before. 
Meanwhile, along with the textbooks, publishers also covered past war crimes more 
comprehensively than before, catering vivid descriptions, concrete figures, gruesome 
pictures, and even naming individual victim villages or persons. The film industry 
dedicated at least three movies to the Nanjing Massacre alone.108 Numerous popular 
books on this topic were published, many of which were products of the initiatives of 
local governments and individual publishers and writers rather than the central 
government. 109  Even periodicals sponsored by the state published articles 
sympathetic to individual demands for war reparation.110  
Facing these delicate changes in people’s opinion on Japan, the government took 
a moderate position to co-opt rather than suppress the popular sentiment. Such a 
move significantly determined the reporting pattern of the media. In terms of the 
quantity of the reports, besides the fact that the Sino-Japanese relationship has always 
been a focus of the media second only to the U.S.-China relationship, it is also true 
that the extent of coverage will accordingly increase when there emerge certain issues 
in the relationship.111 Regarding the content of the reports, with a brief examination, 
the proportion of articles that embraced the negative side went up tremendously, 
especially after 1995.112  
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However firmly the official media stayed in line with the state, other 
unprecedented factors brought certain variations to their manipulation of the agendas. 
Even the official media, for example, Xin-Hua, had to play a more subtle game than 
before when faced with the diplomatic issues. Thus generally the official media voice 
on Japan juxtaposes an attitude of building a reconciled Sino-Japanese relationship 
and a tough position on sensitive war related issues. Meanwhile, the public tendency 
to addict to negative information about Japan and the increasing influence of 
nationalist sub-elites through the unofficial media strengthen the power of a radical 
aggressive anti-Japanese voice. The variations also encompass the financial concern 
that the more choices of media people have, the quicker information flow that drives 
the media to provide higher-quality reports. Most importantly, the editors and 
reporters tend to have new perspectives to produce the reports due to the replacement 
of the old generation by the young. Young people appear to be more hostile against 
Japanese though.  
Intriguing is the role of cyberspace and how much it has contributed to the 
transmission of anti-Japanese message. The World Wide Web, online news, blogs, 
and BBS in China facilitate a broader range of discussion and postings of critical 
articles on China-Japan relations than the traditional media, even if they are still not 
enough to be called safe heavens for dissidents.113 
Media commercialization and diversification have ended the state monopoly on 
the information supply and enabled pluralistic expression of divergent opinions, 
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including those on foreign affairs.114 Some media study scholars made the interesting 
point that nationalism in today’s China has considerable consumption value, that the 
media sells packaged nationalism at huge profits and with official blessing.115 
Unofficial media seem to be more thoughtful of people’s emotions on this issue rather 
than complying with the government completely.116  
Such trend is somehow inevitable in that the government itself has not considered 
it a problem if it still preserves a rather pragmatic pattern on China-Japan relations. In 
other words, a better China-Japan relationship is actually what the Chinese 
government desires but it opts for maintaining the status-quo because both the 
objective situations in the two countries have made such a possibility dangling. Thus 
the approach of Beijing toward anti-Japanese nationalism is a new twofold: 
withholding its unyielding stance on the history issues while keeping the diplomatic 
relations with Japan on the right track by restraining the popular actions at home. 
Similarly, the official media have always been riding on the fence too. The difference, 
though, is due to the obsolete and passive institutional function the media implements. 
Generally the media still instruct the public opinion in line with the government. In 
this regard, the party sets the tone, while the media can attach their own sub-agendas 
and present them in a more dramatic, eye-catching and assertive manner. There is no 
direct evidence implying that the state propaganda guide the commercial mass media 
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to carry negative reports about Japan.117 
 
PUBLIC: RALLYING BEFORE TRAUMAS 
 
Unlike the intricate dilemma both the government and mass media have to live 
with, the public perception was rapidly inclining to an extreme. Studies show that 
negative reporting of Japan has exceeded favorable coverage in the Chinese media 
since the late 1990s. Some official mouthpieces such as the People’s Daily have a 
much lower rate of negative reporting than non-propaganda newspapers though.118 
This indicates that the public has gone far beyond the official line in demonizing 
Japan. A greater social involvement has complicated the management of the 
relationship. Whenever there is a conflict of interest with Japan, the Chinese people 
always expect Japan to make concessions as they take it for granted that Japan owes 
China too much through history. Any public rituals, symbols of commemoration and 
recalls of the historical traumas, no matter by individual narrative or mass media 
transmission, deeply inscribed a collective anti-Japanese memory into the whole 
nation, strongly oppressing any unreal attempt of forgiving. The leaders, journalists, 
media editors and most Chinese people are linked together by a persistent sense of 
sameness in this particular case. In this respect, the traumatic past is so overwhelming 
that it continues to shape the interactions. Far from being forgotten, the past is 
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continually relieved in the present.119  
A group of historical activists who have gained increasing academic 
independence and political autonomy from the state have largely driven the growing 
public attention for the past two decades on Japanese war atrocities.120  Their 
rediscovery of the traumatic history also further inspired the media investigation.  
What further complicates the issue is the transformation of memory itself-from 
public narrative to hybrid forms of individualized and publicly contested memories 
that are subject to mobilization via multiple media of communication. 121  The 
prevalence of the Internet, along with the fact that the Chinese public could have 
fairly strong reactions on certain international political events, has made it imperative 
to look at the public opinion. Eykholt points out that “criticism of government 
concessions to Japan had appeared clandestinely” in the early 1980s.122 Individual 
victims also refer to the government’s magnanimous policy (i.e., the decision to 
waive reparations in 1972), but insist that the debts of blood must still be repaid by 
the Japanese government.123  
As for the young people who have much tougher stances on issues of 
Sino-Japanese relations, it should be highlighted that children inheriting the traumas 
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from the old generation are compelled to perform, such as conducting the mourning 
that the mother cannot, perform, or repairing the mother so that she will regain 
psychological health.124 Logically, the first generation who actually experienced the 
war or the second generation who lived their youth during the 1950s and 1960s 
should be more sensitive and resentful about the history issues. Quite on the contrary, 
the younger generation who has little direct war memory turns out to be the driving 
force in the anti-Japanese protests and held a more extrusive nationalistic stance.125  
After the old generation, the chosen traumas were not only reawakened but 
further fostered among the young generation who inherited the trans-generational 
traumas by means of historical records, mass media reports and other forms of 
reminders. Unlike the old Chinese, though, the so called fourth generation has never 
been directly victimized. Cathy Caruth, for example, argues that trauma is capable of 
being passed on not only between people, but also across generations and cultures.126  
Nowhere is this hyper-hostility of Japan more visible than in Chinese cyberspace. 
In absence of an aggressive official media, students and other youth descend on 
internet cafes and sought out other sources of information.127 In some cases, it is 
beyond the government’s capacity to police cyberspace in the way it controls the 
traditional print press. Hence in light of free flow of information, some may predict 
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that the public opinion could become relatively objective caused by the diversity of 
messages they accept. Instead, regarding the acquired paradigm of the Chinese public, 
the effect of free information is limited. Such a paradigm is the result of the 
convergence of old paradigms and interpretations of current international situations 
among different sections of Chinese society,128 mixed with the conceptual help from 
the west. In fact, the easier information transmits in the cyberspace, the more 
nationalistic the Chinese people could become. It is because the established chosen 
traumas would push the information receivers to accept the negative news that would 
reconfirm their perception, while ignoring or even accusing the information 
contradictory to their interpretative framework.  
According to the Public opinion investigation by Daily Yomiuri, from 1988-1992, 
the percentage of the Chinese respondents who like Japan was even a little larger than 
that in Japan and actually increased during the four years.129 Almost 69% of the 
interviewees claimed confident of the development of Sino-Japanese relations into the 
next five years.130 Nevertheless, according to an investigation organized by the 
International Politics Research Association of Beijing University, 60% of the 
respondents expressed their views that the formalization in 1972 when China gave up 
compensation sacrificed the national interests.131 
While it is still possible for the government to create a slogan of friendship, 
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chances are slim for the public to speak about a sincere Chinese friendship with Japan. 
Even if the public can be persuaded by immediate interests to be conciliatory and 
restrained, they would neither forget nor forgive Japanese invasion; in the long run, 
their grievances against Japan would only explode with greater scale and intensity, 
just like what has happened since the 1980s.  
After 1995, the situation seemed to be far more disappointing. With the support 
of the new victim narrative, the reactivation of chosen traumas triggered the outpour 
of people’s emotions of self-pity and grievances. The public was thus preoccupied 
with a sense of suffering and felt little sympathy for Japan. Both the percentage of 
interviewees who thought Japan was trustable had declined significantly to below 
40%, as was shown by the investigation of Daily Yomiuri in 1996.132 In 1997, 25 
years after the formalization of the diplomatic relations, Asahi News organized 
another poll showing that 34% of the respondents in China dislike Japan.133 In 2001, 
for the 30th anniversary of the diplomatic formalization, Asahi News initiated the 
second poll on mutual perceptions and the outcome indicated that the percentage of 
people who dislike Japan rose to about 54%. The first-ever joint poll, carried out by 
CASS and Asahi News in 2002 indicated that 50% of the Chinese respondents 
thought the Sino-Japanese relationship was only going “okay”, and when asked to 
qualify this answer, the major reason on the Chinese side was the Japanese failure in 
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understanding history.134  
During the recent years, the Chinese people have even put their enmity into 
radical protests in which they could fight for the historical justice, the sovereignty of 
Diaoyu Island, and against whatever was done by the Japanese government offending 
their feelings. Chinese students even link the economic issues to the history problem. 
They see the flooding of Japanese goods into the Chinese market as Japan’s renewed 
attempt of an economic invasion, and accuse it of holding back China’s technological 
development.135 The “time collapse” in traumatic memory creates a current image 
mixed with the past facts, which makes the economic or strategic issues inseparable 
from the historical memory. In 2005, ignited by Japan’s bid for UNSC, spontaneous 
and sporadic actions resulted, far from ending, into an anti-Japanese riot exploding in 
several major cities in China.  
Supported by the strong grievances and humiliation boosted by the chosen 
traumas, the unconstrained public emotions can even politicize and escalate trivial 
frictions into major diplomatic disturbances. In 2003, about 1,000 Chinese college 
students marched into the streets of Xi’an protesting an obscene skit performed by 
several Japanese students during a university festival. This incident led to widely 
spread online attacks across the nation and caused deep concern of the local 
government.136 Concerning other major issues that China and Japan seem to disagree 
                                                        
134 Liu Zhiming, Zhong Ri Xiang Hu Yi Shi Diao Cha Gai Shu (The investigation of the mutual 
perception of Chinese and Japanese), COMRC, http://www.comrc.com.cn/ 
135  A Detailed Instruction on the Protest Against Right Wing Japanese 
http://www.shanghaidiaries.com/archives/2005/04/15/a_detailed_instruction_on_the_protest_agai
nst_right_wing_japanese/ 
136 “Culture clash: curtain still raised on Chinese protests over obscene skit.” Asahi.com, (3 
November 2003). 
  - 65 -
on, public pressure could hamper smooth and expeditious settlement of bilateral 
disputes. It is not warranted that Chinese people can distinguish the hatred toward the 
militaristic and right-wing minority from the dislike towards Japanese people, as what 
the government propaganda always addresses in accordance with the past proletarian 
internationalism.  
In conclusion, the awkward China-Japan relationship is not so much due to the 
political or economic imbalance as the national chosen traumas deeply rooted in this 
partially reformed country. Such a traumatic memory significantly constrains the 
possibility of forgetting the past and the emergence of an alternative view on Japan 
and Sino-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, a new thinking from the Chinese 
academics, arguing for an analytical and emotion-free approach to Japan, has 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES 
INTRODUCTION: 
In this chapter, three case studies, i.e. 1998 Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan, the 
failure of the New Thinking, and the 2007 Fukuda visit to Beijing, will be employed. 
Jiang’s case will show us that the chosen trauma factor could become a barrier to the 
normal progress of reconciliation between China and Japan, and even affect leaders’ 
personal decision making. The New Thinking case will help us understand why 
certain explorative rational opinions picturing a future-oriented Sino-Japanese 
relationship failed, consistent with the evolution of the chosen traumas among the 
public. I will also try to decipher the causes of the challenges facing the new thinking. 
Confronting the rooted psychological scheme of the Chinese people, or asserting that 
people could downplay the role of their traumatic memory, the new thinking would 
actually generate more anger and dissidents from the Chinese public. The final case 
study of Fukuda’s recent visit to China in 2007 will explain the variation of chosen 
traumas among the state, media and public on a particular event and the impact on the 
gradually larger difference between the state and public in dealing with Japan. 
Despite the state efforts to rebuild the dynamics of the Beijing-Tokyo interaction, the 
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1998 JIANG ZEMIN’S VISIT TO JAPAN 
Beijing began the 1990s with a strongly conciliatory approach toward Japan as it 
sought to break out of its diplomatic isolation from Western nations. It also 
accommodated Japanese sensitivities and avoided controversies, keeping potentially 
touchy issues off the agenda.137 The evolution of China’s approach toward the old 
memory gradually transformed from the chosen glory myths (the proletarian thought) 
to a more practical new diplomatic thinking. Rather than aiming at the bilateral 
relations, the government mainly used some sporadic emerging agendas like the text 
book issue to stir up patriotism for the sake of internal stability. 
In many ways, Jiang Zemin closely followed such a diplomatic strategy toward 
Japan, which was actually created and consolidated by Mao and Deng. Aside from the 
visits of PM Kaifu, Emperor Akihito, and PM Hosokawa, whereby the history issues 
were deliberately obscured, Jiang even said “It is important for the Chinese to forget 
about the past and turn their eyes to the future…We should recognize that continuing 
to hark back to the unfortunate events of the past will not benefit Sino-Japanese 
relations”.138  
   Before the 1998 visit, Jiang was confident about a more conciliatory 
Sino-Japanese relationship. There was no sign that Jiang would behave like a 
spokesperson for the chosen traumas or acted like the generation whose identity was 
imprinted with the war memory. To a large extent, Jiang seemed to signal that he 
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intended to step away from the memory puzzle and act rationally in response to 
China-Japan relations, or in my analysis, be immunized from the trans-generational 
chosen traumas. 
The 1998 visit, however, also known as the first formal visit of Jiang Zemin as 
the PRC President to Japan, turned out to be undermined by the impossibility of both 
leaders to agree on the wording of a joint declaration. By contrast with former leaders 
such as Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, due to both his personal reason and the 1995 
Murayama statement, 139  Jiang actually appeared much tougher on the history 
problem, despite generally inheriting the old strategy. As a result, the 1998 visit of 
Jiang ended up doing long-term damage to the bilateral relationship unnecessarily, 
even though the initial intention was to improve it.140 
Shortly after an ice-breaking visit by Kim Daejung, when the ROK president 
agreed to settle the past in exchange for a written apology, Jiang’s visit was expected 
to achieve the same goal in both China and Japan. To some extent, as one of the two 
major countries that suffered from Japan’s invasion, Korea’s success in getting a 
written apology caused potential pressure to the Chinese government. Chosen 
traumas in Sino-Japanese relations are largely comparison based, interaction based, 
socially shared, and reinforced.141 South Korea, also a major victim of the Japanese 
imperialism, affects deeply the Chinese emotions on the traumatic memory. Some 
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Chinese nationalists complain that their fellow Chinese are not as aggressive as South 
Koreans. Chinese should be more emotional and less of forgiving.142 The victory of 
another group that might have suffered from the same traumas could not necessarily 
appease the potential motivation of a group to forget about revenge; quite on the 
contrary, it may actually provide a strong signal to further illicit the focus on the past 
traumas.143 Prior to his visit, Jiang emphasized the need for a solution to the haunting 
history problem. Obuchi, the Japanese Prime Minister at that time, also hoped a 
successful summit with Jiang could facilitate his future-oriented diplomacy with 
China.  
Before the final visit, Jiang outlined his principle on the matter. He stated that 
“Japan’s invasion of China made huge suffering to the Chinese people.”144 Initially 
the Chinese side asked for Japan’s re-confirmation of the validity of Murayama’s 
1995 statement. Following Jiang’s postponement of his visit and then Kim Daejung’s 
state visit, however, by mid-October the Chinese side requested an apology in the 
China-Japan declaration just as with the Japan-Korea declaration. Rejected by the 
Japanese government with only a willingness to face the history problem 
straightforwardly, Jiang responded by acknowledging the difficulty of reaching a 
consensus but he was still adamant that a “correct attitude” should be shown by the 
Japanese side first.145  
During the first two-day round of sessions held in Hakone, Jiang and Obuchi 
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settled down smoothly. Furthermore, both agreed to conduct annual mutual visits 
from then on. In the framework of my thesis, it is evident that most of the strategic 
concerns at that time did not impede conference progress. Nevertheless, nothing 
could be resolved on the past history and the matter was left to the last moment 
between the two Foreign Ministers. They reached a general agreement after 
consuming discussion: while the world “aggression” would be incorporated into the 
joint declaration, “apology” would not. Similar to the Japan-Korea declaration, PM 
Obuchi was said to secretly offer a written apology in the statement in exchange for 
an assurance that China would not raise the history problem again. He also took a 
verbal apology as plan B after Beijing turned down the offer.146 
The partial compromise of the Japanese side, however, was far from enough to 
satisfy the needs of Jiang Zemin who already established a firm mindset about the 
summit meeting. Unlike the moderate statement before the visit, Jiang gradually 
changed his mild and rational tone before the visit. His position and following 
behavior was more like a spokesperson for the chosen traumas, clinching on making 
the history problem as the hinge of his visit, while downplaying other positive 
aspects.  
Jiang’s personal memory of history is an interesting element in this case even 
though it alone may not be sufficient to determine the course of the 1998 Japan visit. 
According to his official biographical sketch published in 1998, Jiang was born in 
August 1926 to a traditional intellectual family in Yangzhou. His uncle and foster 
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father, Jiang Shangqing, who exerted a great influence on the younger Jiang 
becoming a revolutionary later, “led a regional anti-Japanese armed force in the 
northeast of Anhui Province and north of the Huai River, and sacrificed his life for the 
country in a battle.”147  It is not unwarranted to claim that Jiang’s unpleasant 
experiences with Japanese occupation and the memory of his personal traumas 
somehow shaped his dislike of Japan.148 As a “child” experiencing huge loss in the 
war, Jiang inherited the traumas, along with many other Chinese, from the old 
generation.149 It is hard to predict how much influence individual psychological 
factor could have on international politics. As the top leader of the PRC, however, 
Jiang’s decision making and performance with regard to the 1998 visit seemed 
sophisticated in terms of whether normal state interaction could be disturbed and 
influenced by the individual psychological factor of a decision maker. 
In a report on the issues of history and Taiwan, Jiang stated that he was opposed 
to the general feeling that the history issue had been resolved, and he referred to 
Japan’s militarist past and the suffering inflicted upon the Chinese people.150 Such a 
position was reiterated at the banquets with the Emperor and Prime Minister Obuchi. 
Surprising to the Emperor and Obuchi who actually addressed little about the past, 
disappointed, Jiang seized every opportunity to reiterate Japan’s past aggression 
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against China and the tremendous Chinese loss of human life and property. 151 As a 
result, Jiang’s statement led to a strong reaction from the Japanese media and public. 
The Japanese media raised all these scenarios shortly after Jiang’s statement that by 
playing history card, Jiang scored points at home and drummed up support from the 
conservative factions in Beijing.152 
Such disputes did not hurt the inclusion of the word “aggression” in the joint 
declaration and it was the first time the word was used in an official document in the 
history of Sino-Japanese relations. Nevertheless, opposing the request of the Chinese 
side, the word “apology” was not included, unlike what happened in the Korea-Japan 
declaration. In consequence, the choice of wording of Obuchi in response to Jiang’s 
request totally overshadowed other positive results of negotiation such as the loan 
package and the cooperation plan.153 
As usual, the mainstream Chinese media glossed over what was being described 
as a public relations disaster, as they considered it an absolute principle that the entire 
public attention should be led to the positive sides of diplomatic activities.154 The 
newspaper did not disclose the dissatisfaction with the lack of a written apology other 
than Obuchi’s oral apology and Jiang’s strong position on the history problem.155 
Subsequent coverage in People’s Daily naturally only reported some amicable tone 
from Jiang’s speech at Waseda University and a following press conference. Indicated 
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in the reports later, however, in response to a question about the failure of both sides 
to sign the joint declaration, Jiang stressed the fact that the declaration represented a 
solemn pledge regardless of whether the document had been signed or not.156  
Despite Jiang’s dissatisfaction, the issue did not appear to have a lasting adverse 
effect on the relationship as far as the official Chinese discourse is concerned. The 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs references the visit in the history section and its 
tone is still fairly positive. By sharp contrast, the meeting between Chinese Premier 
Zhu Rongji and Prime Minister Obuchi in Beijing in July 1999 was characterized by 
an avoidance of history-related matters. Zhu even acknowledged that the history 
problem was a sensitive issue. One year later, in 2000, he restated his position that 
“China will not keep demanding apologies from Japan”. 157  It proved us the 
possibility for the Chinese state to avoid making sharp comments on the history issue 
but instead focus on the bilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, Zhu’s initial goodwill 
was undermined by a series of blatant Yasukuni Shrine visits of Koizumi after 2002 
and such a recession again reminded the Chinese of the old war trauma and further 
agitated the anti-Japanese sentiment.  
Jiang’s 1998 visit shows perfectly how the past weighs on the present. Under the 
overarching framework of reconciliation, the central problem of China-Japan 
relations, i.e. the history issue, can be conceptualized as dealing with the past. Jiang’s 
1998 visit was widely viewed as a failure because of his overemphasis on the details 
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of the apology that caused a major backlash. 158  Jiang’s performance was 
considerably off the track in terms of treating his first visit to Japan as a tour of 
getting Japanese acknowledgment on their past crimes. The success of the Korean PM 
visit also encouraged him to prioritize getting a written apology. 
In general, such a diplomatic failure could not only be attributed to the individual 
chosen trauma of Jiang, but also the potential pressure in Beijing that China could not 
lose face for getting nothing from the Japanese government while the Korean 
government partly achieved its goals. As indicated in the previous chapters, chosen 
traumas could be most ignited with the help of some particular event or case. As a 
best example for comparison, ROK could make some Chinese feel embarrassed about 
what they see as a far less emotional response to the Japanese. A seemingly and 
temporary success of another group in getting even would thus further incite the 
consciousness of past injustice and the determination for revenge.159   
Such a paradoxical position, caused by overly focusing on the history problem, 
seriously troubled the already downward Sino-Japanese relations and the possibility 
of facilitating reconciliation. Fully aware of the anti-Japanese resentment and the 
uncertainty of such a national emotion, Jiang felt it a legitimate and necessary action 
to persist on the apology issue.160 All in all, such a diplomatic disaster proves that the 
chosen trauma factor could act as a barrier for the China-Japan reconciliation. 
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THE PREDICAMENT OF “NEW THINKING” 
 
Around 2003-2004, there emerged some Chinese scholars who believe that perhaps 
Japan has apologized enough. These scholars are not influenced by the traumatic 
memory and significantly take a unique rational approach in understanding the 
history problem. Such a different thought in support of a more conciliatory approach 
was labeled as a “New thinking toward Japan”. When these scholars tried to break out 
of the limit of memory, however, their voice, as a result, was harshly criticized among 
the intellectuals and popular opinions, regardless of whether their points make sense 
or not.  
As revealed earlier, the Chinese state has recently held a more ambiguous 
position in dealing with Japan. In many cases, the top leaders and foreign ministers 
understand that sometimes putting history aside would secure a much easier 
diplomatic atmosphere for the Beijing-Tokyo interaction. Such an understanding, or 
more precisely a pragmatic approach, was not only discussed behind closed doors at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and Zhong Nan Hai, the leadership compound 
in central Beijing, but also debated with passion by both academic experts and 
popular nationalists.161  
A well-known People’s Daily editor, Ma Licheng, asserted that “the Japanese 
apology issue has been resolved. There is no need to be inflexible on the form of 
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apology.” He also argued that the current anti-Japanese feelings were grounded not 
only in misperception but also were detrimental to China’s efforts to develop 
amicable relations with neighboring countries. 162  Echoing Ma’s unprecedented 
statement, a leading international relations scholar, Shi Yinghong, published an 
article calling for a diplomatic revolution in China’s relationship with Japan. Ma and 
Shi’s views indicated the problem of dwelling too much on the past and its possibility 
of hurting China’s international reputation as well as its social stability. 
Ma and Shi, along with their minority supporters, have shown an example of how 
independent intellectuals can be somehow immunized from the chosen traumas and 
try to break the history dilemma through their explorative ideas. Not as much as a 
treatment, the new thinking proposed by Ma and Shi suggests a latent concern for the 
danger to a certain group by overly dwelling on the past and avoiding the future. In an 
essay that launched thousands of critical commentaries on the Internet and in print 
outlets, Ma suggested boldly that China should move beyond the shadow of history 
and improve its relations with Japan. Thus, opposing the drowning in negative war 
memories, Ma’s essay tried to cast the understanding of China and Japan differently: 
Japan as a developed, peaceful country and China as no longer a victim.163 
Shi Yinhong, employed as a professor of People’s University, published another 
article shortly afterwards, advocating a diplomatic revolution to seek a closer 
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relationship between China and Japan. 164  His perspective from the broad 
international balance of power was from a different angle than Ma’s. “It will be 
extremely beneficial to China,” he writes, “if, through improving relations with Japan, 
China can improve its security environment and its diplomatic position”. 165 
Determined not to be strangled by the memory burden, he argued that “We cannot 
forget history, but we cannot stagnate in history either.” “We cannot slip into 
emotion,” Shi pleaded, “but must focus on strategic relations”.166 Both Ma and Shi 
advocated that China’s Japan policy should focus on the strategic and economic 
benefits of their cooperation and avoid being bogged down by the history quarrels 
that only involve secondary interests.167 
Even if Ma and Shi’s real goal was trying to explore a third way of breaking the 
deadlock of the reconciliation, their unique position elicited huge debates and fervent 
personal attacks on the Internet. Some observers claimed that their position was 
indeed tacitly supported by the top leaders.168 Even though Ma and Shi’s new 
thinking was not a revolutionary change in Chinese government’s Japan policy, some 
analysts believed that both Ma and Shi had political connections within the Hu Jintao 
leadership. Some people, including many Japanese researchers focusing on China, 
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speculated that the “new thinking” represented a “trial balloon” from Hu on the Japan 
policy.169 
As this paper has claimed previously about the public, however, the massive 
resentment towards the Japanese could not tolerate such a heterodoxy point. 
Compared with the accumulated heritage of anti-Japanese movies, publishers, TV 
documentaries, exhibitions, and museums, the new thinking appeared both accidental 
and antipathetic to the public. 
Ma’s controversial position that the history question be put to rest quickly came 
under fire. A summer 2003 War of Resistance contained over a dozen essays strongly 
disagreeing with Ma.170 One of those voices that attracted the most attention was 
Feng Zhaokui who is a famous scholar in Japan studies. He insisted that the history 
question is “difficult, complex, emotional and long-term” and therefore is likely to 
persist for a long time.171 Likewise, Shi also quickly came under heavy and sustained 
attacks. One of his first and most ferocious critics was from Lin Zhibo of People’s 
Daily. Lin was indignant about Shi’s “irresponsible” attitude towards the history 
problem. “People have memories, and a nation’s memory cannot be erased…Instead 
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of asking the Chinese government to be tolerant and magnanimous, it should be more 
important to ask the Japanese government to restrain its ugly behaviors”172  
The critiques from intellectuals were still quite mild compared with Ma and Shi’s 
treatment on the Internet and in real life from the public. Ma was repeatedly called a 
“traitor”. His address and phone numbers were posted on the web along with a call to 
burn down his house.173 In a post entitled “Ma Licheng, we say no to you!” on 
Xinhua.net Forum, an anonymous netizen concluded with the line: “Ma Licheng, it 
doesn’t matter how much you kiss Japanese ass, we have only one thing to say to you: 
the devils will be back!”174 Ma even received death threats. In the summer of 2003, 
Ma requested and received early retirement from the People’s Daily and left 
Beijing. 175  Both Ma and Shi were labeled as “Japan-lover”, “Traitors”, and 
“Pro-Japan People” (qinri).176 Even more strikingly, the new thinking did not stem 
the swelling tide of anti-Japanese popular opinion in 2003-2004. The new thinking 
proved totally unacceptable in academic circles and to the broader public, while at the 
same time the diplomatic performance of the Chinese state have in many cases 
followed the new thinking by cooling down the heat towards Japan. 
Ma and Shi’s points, to a large extent, were actually in line with the tendency of 
the state discourse, especially after Hu Jintao’s accession. Most of the ideas were also 
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endorsed by many Japanese and Western scholars.177 Nevertheless, the major cause 
of the failure of their rational and prospective proposals is exactly what this paper has 
tried to argue, i.e. chosen traumas, when evolved into an ethnical marker of the 
Chinese identity, virtually constraints the change of the popular opinion on 
China-Japan relations.  
The crushing defeat of Ma and Shi’s attempts proved that it was substantially 
against the evolution of people’s chosen traumas to simply provide a seemingly 
innovative policy consideration while actually returning to the old strategy of the 
1970s, and brushing the concerns about history aside for practical purposes. It was 
evident that starting from the activation of the traumas in the 1980s, toward the time 
collapse of linking the present event to past traumas, the chosen traumas of the 
Chinese people has already evolved into considerable irrational discourse and 
behavior. No matter how insightful the views actually were, when they appeared to 
drastically confront the rooted psychological scheme of the Chinese people, or to 
imply that people could erase their traumatic memory, the reawakening of long 
suppressed suffering could understandably generate enormous anger toward Japan. 
Sporadic and trivial accidents could be magnified as an immediate and proximate 
presence under the name of remembering history. Likewise, rational and practical 
approaches could be misinterpreted as traitors’ language and ridiculous opinions. 
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The case of the 2003 New Thinking also highlights another part of the chosen 
trauma perspective. That is, unless people could forsake their determination to get 
even or get justice, there can be no new beginning and no transformation of the 
relationship. Everyone will remain imprisoned in a particular history, recycling old 
crimes and hatreds while the present is dominated by a particular past collective 
memory. Most posts in the online forums covering the political or social news about 
Japan and Sino-Japanese relations would naturally be followed by nasty attacks and 
profanity.178 It is not difficult for us to understand why the new thinking would be 
swiftly criticized, scolded, and ridiculed by the netizens. Being the subject of the 
chosen traumas and the major force in the protests, this generation of young Chinese 
has transformed their dissatisfaction with Japan into attacks and violent actions.  
  Once established, public resentment against Japan also creates social pressure on 
what might be called deviant ideas or behaviors. As a Chinese journalist notes 
correctly, comments on the Internet push each other to become more extreme, and 
those who voice moderate opinion (even not as provocative as the new thinking) get 
lambasted. This verbal tyranny has silenced moderates and encouraged those in the 
middle to become more extreme.179 
One step further than merely “the intention to get even” or “irrational expression 
and behavior”, the whole hatred and anger toward Japan finally evolved into a mass 
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riot sweeping major cities in 2005. The Anti-Japanese demonstrations of 2005 were a 
series of demonstrations, some peaceful, some violent, sparked off by a number of 
issues, including the approval of a Japanese history textbook and the proposal that 
Japan be granted a permanent seat on the UNSC. Some businesses with connections 
to Japan were vandalized by protesters, as were billboards advertising Japanese goods 
and stores stocking Japanese made products.180 Before being mobilized into such a 
mass movement, the anti-Japanese sentiment had actually brewed for a long period of 
time, with the support of numerous online articles that are more accessible than paper 
work through cyber forums and bulletin systems. College students, a few grassroots 
nongovernmental anti-Japanese nationalists, and some passionate intellectuals 
became the major force that inspired the massive anti-Japanese sentiment and finally 
stepped up to initiate the protests.  
   In general, it is proper to define the new thinking event as an interlude interrupted 
in the heated anti-Japanese sentiment around 2003-2005. It is likely that Ma and Shi, 
along with a few other intellectuals who supported their ideas, consciously felt the 
danger of such strong and largely irrational anti-Japanese sentiments among the 
public. Unfortunately, the result of their proposals has offered us a best case to test 
how the public’s established chosen trauma scheme would respond to something that 
virtually challenges their mindset. To sum up, the well-advised new thinking was 
easily knocked out by the activated chosen traumas.   
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2007 FUKUDA’S VISIT TO CHINA 
 
Before Fukuda’s accession to power, Chinese PM Wen had already established a more 
amicable diplomatic channel with Abe Shinzo. Despite the mutual visits between the 
two leaders, however, Abe’s hawkish background and ambiguous position on the 
Yasukuni Shirine Visit did not really dispel the worries. As far as the Chinese side is 
concerned, Fukuda’s arrival in office heralded a break from the ambitious nationalist 
politics promoted by Abe, who repeatedly invoked the need for a more assertive 
Japan that is less apologetic about its imperial history. Fukuda’s friendly China policy, 
in line with Abe’s stance, could thus be more practical and less worrying as his 
background seemed to make him more approachable than Abe.  
Early in the first meeting between Fukuda and Wen Jiabao in Singapore, they 
agreed on that the two nations have entered a new stage of deepening strategic ties, 
with Fukuda planning a China visit as early as next month and Wen’s promising 
efforts to resolve a long-running gas exploration dispute in the East China Sea. 
Apparently his vow to not visit the Yasukuni Shrine paved the way for both the 
leaders to put aside disputes about history. 2007 is the 35th anniversary of the 
normalization of Sino-Japanese relations and both leaders agreed to take the chance to 
accelerate the conciliation steps that began in 2006. 
With the positive atmosphere created by Wen and Abe, Fukuda took this visit as 
an opportunity to constructively contribute to the forging of "strategically reciprocal 
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relations”.181 Negotiating the East China Sea oil dispute and promoting business 
opportunities for Japanese companies were the major points of his visit. Wen and 
Fukuda reached consensus on the East China Sea issue, agreeing to continue the 
consultation at the vice-ministerial level to seek workable solutions. Aside from talks 
with Chinese leaders, Fukuda delivered a speech at Beijing University and played 
baseball with Premier Wen, as Wen showed his baseball interest and skills during his 
visit in Kyoto. Fukuda not only visited Qu Fu-the birth place of Confucius-as a sign 
of respect for the Chinese cultural heritage in Japan, but also a portal in Tianjin that 
might be open to considerable Japanese investment. The two sides agreed that 
President Hu will pay a visit to Japan next spring, which would be the first visit to 
Japan by Chinese head of state in ten years since Jiang Zemin in 1998. As to the 
Taiwan issue, Fukuda stated four “NOs”, saying Japan would give no support to the 
claims of “one China, one Taiwan”, “Taiwan independence” or “Taiwan authorities” 
attempts to seek UN membership through “referendum”. 
When Fukuda wrapped up his four-day tour in China, his visit was seen as a 
“herald of spring” for China-Japan ties.182 From “ice-breaking” to “a herald of 
spring”, at least at the governmental level, the umbrage of 2005 seemed to have been 
dissipated effectively by the diplomatic efforts. The media reports naturally went 
along with the state by highlighting the positive elements of Fukuda and the 
possibility of a future-oriented Sino-Japanese relationship. Concerning the history 
issue, Fukuda said Japan would “very earnestly” reflect on the “agonizing part of 
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history” and continue to follow the path of peaceful development in the hope of 
establishing “forward-looking China-Japan relations”.183 
Concerning the history issue, Fukuda said Japan would “very earnestly” reflect on 
the “agonizing part of history” and continue to follow the path of peaceful 
development in the hope of establishing “forward-looking China-Japan relations”.184 
Nonetheless, Fukuda’s mild position, with the efforts made by Wen and Abe for the 
last two years did not really change the way Chinese people look at Sino-Japanese 
relations. According to some online polls investigating the public opinion on 
Fukuda’s visit, the negative image of Japan and China-Japan relations did not make 
huge change whereas the media reports kept on highlighting the positivities. Major 
TV networks including CCTV and Phoenix paid significant attention to Fukuda’s visit 
in terms of consecutive reports for days. In addition to the electronic media, print 
media also produced such titles as “Warm Spring Trip”, “Ice-Breaking Trip” to 
highlight the importance of this visit.185 
Such a positive signal and encouraging tone, however, did not effectively reach 
the public. Based on the poll of Phoenix TV online, 69.5% of the respondents 
supported that “The progress is limited. The major problems of the relations remain 
unsolved.” Only 24.3% of the respondents thought “Considerable progress has been 
made.” When asked about the major problems that impeded Sino-Japanese relations, 
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71.6% of the respondents still persisted on the “history issue” and the “Yasukuni 
Shrine Visit.” By contrast, 28.4% of the respondents voted for the East China Sea oil 
disputes, which was the key agenda of the meeting between Wen and Fukuda.186  
Likewise, according to the poll of Wen Hui Daily Online, 41.6% of the 
respondents chose “the history issue” over 15.6% who chose the “oil dispute”.187 In 
order to have a more direct and specific view of the mutual perception change after 
Fukuda’s visit, taking advantage of the field trip to China, I also conducted a survey 
in December 2007 of how the Chinese people perceive the change in Sino-Japanese 
relations (See Table 4.3). When asked “In your opinion, what is the general attitude of 
the Chinese on Japan and Japanese?” 30.1% of the respondents chose “relatively 
hostile” and 22.8% chose “Very hostile.” When asked “How do you think of the 
future trend of Sino-Japanese relations?” only 23% of the respondents chose “Toward 
Reconciliation” while 49% of them considered that “No rapid change could be 
made.”188 56.6% of the respondents still considered the history problem unsolved. 
The results of the surveys, whether from the mass media or the author’s fieldwork, 
indicate that the public’s attitude was not yet affected by the efforts of both 
governments, despite the official drumbeating and propaganda. Also, no improvement 
was witnessed in comparison with the popular opinion on Japan during the Koizumi 
period. In 2002, the China-Japan Mutual-Perception poll showed 43.3% felt 
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unfriendly or very unfriendly towards Japan.189 
Table 4.3 * The 2008 China-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (China)190  
 Positive Relatively positive Negative Relatively negative
General attitude  7% 12% 22% 30% 
Future trend 23% 20% 49% / 
History problem resolved  12% 14% 27% 29% 
Ever since the 1998 Jiang Zemin visit to Japan, the Japanese’s popular opinion 
on relations with China has been suffering from an “apology fatigue.” Even after 
2007, 70% of the Japanese respondents (in Japan) in my survey expressed their 
impatience about the apology demand of the Chinese. Coming to terms with the past 
pain by forgiving history would free people from a particular collective memory, and 
form a new memory that creates the symbolic space for people to orient themselves 
towards a new future. Such a new future would promise the possibility of 
reconciliation with past opponents. Based on the current efforts made by both 
Japanese and Chinese leaders alone, in sharp contrast with the popular animosity, the 
disappearance of the history problem still seems rather idealistic. One of the major 
reasons that cause such a forgiveness dilemma is the failure to set aside the traumatic 
memory.  
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From the public perspective, cynicism becomes inevitable as it is almost 
impossible to draw a clear line between the history problem and contemporary 
Sino-Japanese relations. The media shares a part in terms of pushing the boundary of 
a new approach in dealing with Japan by spreading the new thinking. Nevertheless, 
having been heavily exposed to the details of Japanese war atrocities broadcasted by 
all kinds of media, the Chinese public has been highly receptive to negative news 
about Japan and tends to reject any disconfirming information. In consequence, as 
long as the chosen trauma is still reflected by the media and the historical memory 
still remains, it is impractical to achieve a complete reconciliation, let alone a 
future-oriented Sino-Japanese relationship.  
In conclusion, the case of Fukuda visit, in comparison with the Hu visit, verifies 
the dramatic gap between the state and public in dealing with the chosen traumas on 
China-Japan relations. While the government could still be less emotional and 
demagogic on Japan, or in other words tackle the puzzle of historical memory, the 
chosen traumas of the public have considerably evolved into a constant and 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
Among all the foreign relations of China, the Sino-Japanese relationship has been 
somewhat unique in terms of the frequent conflicts over history issues and war 
memory. The degree and intensity of the mutual mistrust also attracted much attention 
to this topic. In Chapter One and Two, in addition to introducing the importance of 
my research, the general scope and the overarching argument, I have also analyzed 
the Sino-Japanese relationship in the view of reconciliation. Particularly from the 
Chinese side, this thesis has tried to decipher the situation in China in dealing with the 
“shared memory” and “historical justice” elements of reconciliation. To lead 
Sino-Japanese relations to a more constructive direction, therefore, the two countries 
must achieve the goals internalized in the process of reconciliation. As the essence of 
reconciliation, the impact of the collective memory underlines the various difficulties 
for China and Japan to reach a real rapprochement. 
The failure of the Chinese to settle down the history problem, which is largely 
related to the “shared memory” and “justice” of reconciliation, not only magnifies the 
negative side of the history, but also implicates the difficulty for both the 
governments to deal with the strategic issues. This thesis also sheds light on 
understanding the collective memory of the Chinese people on Sino-Japanese 
relations. 
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In Chapter Three, “Chosen traumas”, a concept from the insights of 
psychoanalytic theory is positioned as a key of the collective memory, helping us 
understand the psychological inducement of the history problem. It gives us a more 
explanatory and analytical way than the general Chinese nationalism literature to 
interpret the hinge of the China-Japan quandary, i.e. the past weighs too heavy on the 
present. It may seem odd to discuss reconciliation in the context of a relationship 
between two countries which ceased hostilities nearly sixty years ago, which 
normalized relations thirty years ago, and which are actively pursuing a friendly, 
cooperative partnership at the beginning of the twenty-first century.191  Chosen 
traumas, imprinted on the group psychology of the public and significantly 
determining the political discourse and diplomatic practice of the state, have become 
the central factor restraining the possible reconciliation between China and Japan.  
The chosen traumas also varied among the three actors, i.e. the state, media and 
public, along with the historical progress of Sino-Japanese relations. The period from 
1949, when the PRC was founded, to the early 1980s, which witnessed a benign 
bilateral relationship, makes huge contrast with the time period from the mid-1980s 
till today. With different patterns in dealing with Japan, the chosen trauma factor 
altered the expression and behavior of the three actors, by evolving from a dormant 
historical fact to a necessary part of national identity. 
In Chapter Four, in order to support the arguments in the previous chapters, three 
cases studies provide the empirical evidence of my thesis. From a decision making 
                                                        
191 Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese relations; Facing the past, looking to the future? (Routledge 
Curzon, c2005), p.15. 
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perspective, the 1998 Jiang case shows us how the trauma factor could influence the 
strategic discussion, as well as leaders’ personal decision making. In the case of 2003 
New Thinking, it provides a clear picture of the different patterns of the state, media 
and public in response to a rational and memory-free opinion tacitly endorsed by the 
state. It thus serves as an excellent benchmark to measure the effect of chosen 
traumas on the Chinese society. The final case study draws the contours of the recent 
public opinion and media line when facing an amicable state relationship. It further 
proves the huge gap today between the Chinese state and public in dealing with 
Sino-Japanese relations. Unlike the statement that Sino-Japanese relations have been 
on the right track due to the governmental efforts since 2006, this case indicates that 
the underlining memory element still significantly threatens the future development.  
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Around the middle of May in 2008, President Hu Jintao paid his first formal visit 
to Japan. Not surprisingly, similar to the Fukuda visit in 2007 and the mutual visit of 
PM Wen to Japan afterwards, this visit was also defined as a “Warm Spring Visit.”192 
Numerous positive reports broadcasted about how the Japanese officials and citizens 
warmly greeted the visit of Hu and the significant meaning of his visit to the normal 
development of Sino-Japanese relations. Unlike the major argument of this thesis, the 
media reports attached huge importance to the notion that the biggest hope for 
                                                        
192 See http://www.xinhuanet.com/world/hjt200805/ 
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peaceful co-existence of the two countries still rooted in the public.193 From the 
assessment of this piece, however, whether such a diplomatic reconciliation promises 
a real and future-oriented rapprochement of these two nations is still highly 
questionable, and would have to be tested by time.  
Coincidentally, when this piece of work was under final revision, the outbreak of 
the dispute over Senkaku (Diao Yu) Island between Japan and Taiwan, triggered by an 
incident of fish boat crushing, added another interesting consideration.194 Surrounded 
by strong nationalistic resentment, both from the public and the governing party KMT, 
the island dispute seriously overshadowed the cooperative relations between Japan 
and Taiwan for the past decade.195 Despite the complicated international dynamics 
involved among the chief players in the region, i.e. China, Taiwan, Japan and the U.S., 
the anger upon the “bullying” over the Taiwanese fishing boats was considerably 
related to the history, and the general image of Japanese as past invaders. Such a case 
may help us understand better the chosen traumas among the Chinese (as a people). 
With the Taiwanese case, more factors are available to test the influence of chosen 
traumas on Taiwan-Japan relations, including the colonization heritage, the more 
pluralistic and open state-society dynamics, and the implicit pro-Japan power and 
voice in Taiwan,  
  
 
                                                        
193 Ibid. Also see the consecutive TV reports (News Weekly) on Hu’s visit at CCTV9 (News 
Channel), April 11th, 2008. 
194 Asia-Pacific News, Jun 13, 2008 
195 People’s Daily, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/22/eng20050622_191602.html 
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ACADEMIC IMPLICATIONS 
From a much broader scope, chosen traumas, or other insightful literature from 
the political psychology field, may also help understand the soft side of other 
international relations concerning the PRC, for example, Sino-American relations, 
Sino-Russian relations, and even Sino-Indian relations, to name a few. Not 
necessarily related to the traumas in memory, it may be interesting to focus on the 
memory of war with respect to the military conflicts between each other in history. 
Such studies may help us further elaborate the nationalism among the Chinese public. 
Far from the result of xenophobia, or any kind of pride of a stronger nation, it may be 
necessary to shed light on the historical memory and how the particular memories 
shaped the public perception. In general, rather than get rid of the nationalism 
scholarship, by taking a political psychology approach, it could be helpful to narrow 
down, and specify the scope of the Chinese nationalism literature in investigating 
different cases. In other words, it still has enough space to restructure the knowledge 
of Chinese nationalism by focusing on more specific fields. 
   By contrast with the scholarship of nationalism, which pays significant attention 
to the series of xenophobic activities of the public, the political psychology insights 
could elaborate more profoundly the variation of collective memory in accordance 
with the change of state-society dynamics since the reform and opening. Rather than 
the interpretation of seeking the resurrection of the old glory of Chinese Empire, the 
study on memory may remind us of the negative sense of past history, as well as its 
influence on the Chinese public opinion about certain foreign nations. Among the 
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most important foreign relations of China, the PRC almost had military conflicts, big 
or small, with all the important players in the region including America, Russia, India 
and Japan. Although the degree of negative memory may vary differently regarding 
these relations, the reminder and emphasis on such conflict history would implant 
considerable suspicion and enmity toward a particular country.  
What makes such a research more alluring is the combination of the analysis on 
civil society evolution and media function change. Whereas the Chinese public has 
been opened to more external information and western thoughts, the generic distrust 
on western nations has actually further spread and deepened. Moreover, such a 
paradoxical development would make the media environment more delicate in 
handling the growing nationalism. Last but not the least, in combined with the two 
factors above, another question is about the generation factor, i.e. the younger 
generation appears more nationalistic over certain international relations than the 
older generation who had actually experienced the history. With all these 
considerations involved, the literature on nationalism would have to expand its scope 
to incorporate more research on the Chinese as individuals and groups. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The chosen trauma factor dampens enthusiasm for cooperation between parties, even 
if it alone is not sufficient to cover the whole picture of why two countries fail to 
reconcile in various areas. The contemporary Sino-Japanese relations are thus built 
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upon both the material or strategic interests and the political psychology inducement. 
It is hard to assess and predict whether the chosen traumas that make the Chinese 
project a negative self-image onto the Japanese will gradually disappear, be alleviated, 
or keep lingering. Given the point made by Cooley in Human Nature and the Social 
Order, in a pessimistic sense, “A man in a rage does not want to get out of it…An 
enduring hatred may also be a source of satisfaction to some minds”.196 In general, 
the future reconciliation of China and Japan, if possible, is connected with the 
resolution of historically rooted and visceral distrust of Japan more than the 
negotiation and balance of strategic interests. The influence of chosen traumas over 
generations will still continue, even though the economic relations and growing 
interdependence seem to generally advance regardless of the history problem. As the 
psychological influence is implicit and perplexing, however, it will remain essential 
to investigate Sino-Japanese relations from a political psychology perspective.  
Based on the findings in my thesis, I conclude that the chosen traumas, as a result 
of state ideological restrain to an increasingly independent factor prevailing in the 
public opinion, not only confine the possibility of complete reconciliation, but also 





                                                        
196 Quote Charles Horton Cooley, Human nature and the social order. (New York , Chicago , C. 
Scribner's sons 1922). Peter, Gries, China’s New Nationalism (University of California Press, 
2004), p.51. 
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APPENDICES 
2008 China-Japan Mutual Perception Survey (China) 
 
1. In your opinion, what is the general attitude of the Chinese on Japan and Japanese? 
A. Friendly B. Relatively Friendly C. Relatively Hostile D. Very Hostile E. Not Sure 
 
2. What do you think is the mainstream perception of the Japanese public on Chinese? 
A. Friendly B. Prevailing despise C. Hostile D. Complicated E. Not Sure 
 
3. How do you think of the future trend of Sino-Japanese Relations? 
A. Toward reconciliation B. No rapid change could be made C. Exacerbation D. No Comments 
 
4. In your opinion, what is the main factor disturbing the normal development of the 
Sino-Japanese Relations? (MCQ) 
A. Japan’s attitude in dealing with the history and Taiwan problem 
B. The pro-right trend and the frequent visits of the leaders to Yasukuni Shrine  
C. The rise of China gives pressure to Japan 
D. China’s toughs stance demanding the apology from Japan and Japan’s reluctance to satisfy the 
requests of the Chinese government 
E. Others 
 
5. What do you think of the reports of the mainstream Chinese media on Japan? 
A. Too negative B. Quite objective C. Not enough to disclose the full picture of the Japanese 
atrocity D. Not Sure 
 
6. What was the role of Japan in the World War Two? 
A. Victimizer B. Victim C. The Loser D. Not Sure 
 
7. What do you think is the role of Yasukuni Shrine Visit in Sino-Japanese relations? 
A. Very important B. Important C. Normal D. Neglectable E. No Comments 
 
8. What is the key of the Sino-Japanese Relations in the future? 
A. China should withstand the economic development and keep strong and stable 
B. Japan must apologize 
C. Japan should overcome its nationalism (militarism) 
D. China should be more tolerant and stop going after Japan for the history problem 
E. No comments 
 
9. What are the merits of Japanese that Chinese should learn from? 
A. Persevering 
B. United 
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C. Ambitious 
D. Valorous 
E. The respect for traditional culture 
F. Willing to accept the advanced foreign culture 
G. Having collective belief 
H. Others:  
 
10. What do you think of the Japanese people that you have contacted with before? (MCQ) 
A. Polite B.Fashionable C. Diligent D. Clever E. Brave F. Kind G. Arrogant E. Others (or No 
contact). 
 




Thank you very much! 
 
 
